By Ishita Dutta

After two decades in Kabul, the Taliban’s takeover resulted in utter chaos and rapid evacuations by India and countries around the globe. The Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan is likely to provide a breeding ground to terrorist groups, destabilize the region, and drastically impact India. India’s geopolitical strategy depended heavily on the Afghan government; it shared friendly relations with President Ashraf Ghani. Largely predicated on US military presence, India made a US $3 billion investment in Afghanistan. Currently, New Delhi is optimistic of not having to write everything off that India has invested in Afghanistan. Moreover, India’s External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar, while addressing a group of opposition leaders in Parliament, has reportedly said that India’s investment was in the friendship of Afghan people and that he was sure that it would get the full value of its investment in Afghanistan. However, taking into account the new developments, the future of 1this investment is now uncertain, especially in light of the Taliban takeover, casting a shadow over Indo–Afghan ties. Therefore, the question regarding the future and quality of Indo-Afghan relationship arises naturally considering the socio-political climate.

The Indo-pacific region will also face a surge in instability and insecurity due to the increased threat of terrorism. Taliban’s takeover will impact the future of trade with Kabul, a big blow to India’s strategic interests. Thus, apart from social, political and humanitarian concerns, the economic repercussions of the Taliban’s takeover will likely be negative. Despite India’s unbridgeable differences with the Taliban, New Delhi still has an opportunity to engage with the group in a manner that might take care of its own strategic interests.

India’s limited involvement in peace and negotiations between the Taliban and the US, limited its options. However, India will be looking for opportunities to engage with the Taliban as it tries to secure its interests in the neighbourhood. The three major security crises for India would be the rise in terrorism, a potential refugee crisis, and regional instability. The spectre of the terrorist threat is real given Taliban’s links with trans–national terror groups like the Al-Qaeda, Haqqani network and Lashkar–e-Toiba among others. This will undermine the fight against terrorism and the spectre of radicalization thereby impacting net regional security adversely. Given the adversarial nature of the relationship with Pakistan, heightened mobility of Afghans and ease of access make India a favoured destination for Afghans seeking to escape the excesses of Taliban rule. India may find itself confronted with challenge of dealing with a sizeable number of refugees which would require India to respond with policy innovation and dexterity.

Image Source: Afghan Online Press

Regional instability can be significant for the turmoil in Afghanistan is likely to adversely impact Pakistan which in turn will impact India’s security calculus. India will have to revisit its strategies for management of border security along its western as well as eastern borders with China. The increased involvement of Pakistan and China in Kabul will impact Afghanistan’s ties with India and increase regional friction.

India’s vested interest in Afghanistan has been an essential element in trade connectivity, it links India with the west, and it will remain significant even after the Taliban’s takeover. But the improving ties with China, Belt and Road initiative, and the China-Pakistan economic corridor will create restrictions for Indian interests in Afghanistan under the Taliban. The Pakistan-Afghanistan-China nexus will impact India’s economic and developmental aspirations in the region. The prospect of negotiating with the Taliban is not an easy one for India; after the United States and NATO allies, the most impacted country from the Taliban’s takeover would be India. India’s foreign policy has been non-aligned, and even after the United States announced unconditional withdrawal from Afghanistan, India remained hesitant to deepen ties with the Taliban which has deep links with Pakistan and China and has also been courted by Moscow and Tehran. These developments will impact Indian influence in regional geo–politics.

Image Source: Egypt Independent

The geopolitical landscape does not favour India given India’s lack of geographical contiguity with Afghanistan and the frictional relationship with Beijing and Islamabad as well as changed dynamics with Tehran and Moscow.

While there are challenges for the Taliban as it seeks to acquire legitimacy and enhance its diplomatic options, India appears hesitant to deepen ties with the Taliban. India will be re-evaluating the regional dynamics. India’s foreign policy approach with the neighbouring countries is to strengthen economic development and ensure a secure democratic neighbourhood. The Taliban takeover of Kabul has considerably undermined these efforts. The Indo-Pacific region in the coming years can see cooperation between Pakistan, China, and Afghanistan for its mutual interests, which is not in India’s interest. India’s foreign policy strategy with the Taliban’s takeover is the “wait and watch” approach, which may not be sustainable in the long run.

In the coming years, India’s border security would not be impacted much by refugees, but it will need to find ways to engage with Taliban to protect its key national security interests. The severe change in Afghanistan has resulted in the shift of regional powers to adjust to the changed geo–political landscape. India’s role and engagement in Afghanistan have been through a soft power approach. With, the shift in power dynamics, India faces a difficult and uncertain path to navigate ahead.

References

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