By P V Devika

Abstract
This essay examines how the U.S.-led state-building project in Afghanistan ultimately enabled the Taliban’s return to power in 2021. Contrary to the narrative of a sudden collapse of the Afghan government, it argues that state’s fall was the predictable outcome of years of foreign-driven governance that prioritized militarized security,  and external legitimacy over local inclusion and sustainable institutions. Drawing on evidence from SIGAR reports, investigative journalism, and field research by scholars like Anand Gopal and Sarah Chayes, the essay shows how Afghan national forces were hollowed out by corruption, “ghost soldiers,” and dependency on U.S. support. Meanwhile, the Taliban quietly built parallel governance structures in rural areas, gaining credibility among communities alienated by the Kabul regime. The 2020 Doha Agreement further delegitimized the Afghan government by recognizing the Taliban as the primary negotiating force. This analysis highlights the consequences of top-down, donor-driven reform and warns against future interventions that ignore the centrality of local trust, justice, and accountability in building legitimate states.

Introduction

In August 2021, the Taliban entered Kabul without facing significant resistance, this was not because they had overpowered the Afghan state, but it was because there was no state left to resist. Over the course of nearly two decades, the United States had led a massive intervention to build a democratic state in Afghanistan. Despite this effort, what was left behind was a fragile political structure that could in no way support itself.  When the US withdrew its troops from Afghanistan, images of top officials fleeing and Afghan soldiers surrendering stunned the international community. But for many Afghan citizens and regional experts, this outcome just reflected long-standing problems. ‘Since 2001, the US has spent $2.26 trillion in Afghanistan, the Costs of War Project at Brown University calculates.’ However, the result of these trillions was a government that had become deeply corrupt, overtly dependent on foreign support, and detached from the needs and realities of its own people.

This essay argues that the Taliban’s return to power was not an unexpected turn of events, but rather the predictable result of the U.S. nation-building model that prioritized militarized control and elite partnerships over political legitimacy, local inclusion, and sustainable justice, constructing functional state institutions only on paper.

The Illusion of Security: U.S. Military Aid and the Collapse of the ANSF

The Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) were a key component of this strategy. From the periphery, they were a formidable force, with about 300,000 members who were well-trained and equipped by NATO. However, internal audits conducted by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) later uncovered that as many as 40 to 60 percent of those listed were “ghost soldiers”, people who did not actually exist but were kept on the payroll to divert salaries. Reuters confirmed that 42,000 names were removed from official records once biometric verification was introduced, exposing how despite claims of a massive fighting force, the Taliban couldn’t be defeated because much of that army existed only on paper.

Even the ‘actual’ soldiers that existed, were often poorly trained and lacked effective leadership. According to the SIGAR, the United States made a mistake when it attempted to force advanced Western military technology and management systems on a largely illiterate Afghan security force. This, instead of building an army capable of operating independently, solidified the Afghan army’s systemic reliance on US forces. According to SIGAR, up to 50% of police officers in the south were using drugs while on duty, indicating a widespread breakdown in discipline and morale within the security forces.Once the scaffolding of American funding and airpower was removed, the ANSF collapsed, exposing the fragility of the force that was built more for show than for resilience.

Patronage, Corruption, and the Hollowing of Afghan Institutions

The U.S. mission to build effective governance faced similar problems. Instead of fostering accountable institutions, the intervention empowered corrupt officials, warlords, and private contractors. Large sums of aid intended for basic services like roads, schools, and healthcare instead ended up in overpriced contracts, phony projects, and ghost workers. Due to the large amount of money that flows in unchecked, Afghanistan has continuously been rated as one of the most corrupt nations in the world Since foreign donors accounted for more than 80% of the country’s budget, many Afghan officials prioritized satisfying international organizations’ demands over attending to the needs of their own people. Over time, this weakened public institutions’ credibility by widening the gap between the people and the government.

The Afghan state’s collapse was a human tragedy as much as a political one. Overnight, thousands of Afghans who had collaborated with aid initiatives, civil society, and U.S. forces found themselves in a vulnerable situation. Despite having repeated assurances of protection, numerous people were left stranded amid the Taliban retaliation demonstrating how little long-term planning had gone into the withdrawal strategy by the US. Even after the United States had spent more than $145 billion on reconstruction of the state by 2021, millions of Afghans still lacked trustworthy access to justice, healthcare, and education.

Insurgency by Institution: The Taliban’s Parallel Governance Structures

A parallel system of governance, frequently more responsive and rooted in local realities than the official state, was being steadily established by the Taliban while the internationally supported government faltered. By 2010, local administrative structures had been established in many rural areas. These included their own legal systems, health and education committees, and even systems for collecting taxes. Their organizations functioned in areas where Kabul was either nonexistent or only partially present, and they frequently mirrored official ministries. The Taliban collected utility bills in several provinces, controlled aid organizations, and kept an eye on school curricula to make sure they reflected their views. While their methods were harsh and often repressive, many rural communities saw these systems as more stable and responsive than the central government, which they viewed as distant and corrupt.

This quietly expanding shadow governance system gave the Taliban enough credibility and control to approach peace negotiations as a governing force and not as a defeated insurgency as they had become an alternative form of governance. In 2020, the United States signed the Doha Agreement directly with the Taliban, leaving out the Afghan government entirely. This sidelining suggested that the Taliban were the real power brokers in the country and that the government in Kabul had little authority. While the agreement secured a timetable for U.S. troop withdrawal, it imposed no requirement for the Taliban to disarm, renounce violence, or embrace democratic principles. Analysts at SIGAR noted that this shift further demoralized Afghan forces, who saw the deal as proof that the government had already lost. In the months that followed, many soldiers deserted or surrendered, believing that the fall of the state was just a matter of time.

The U.S. also underestimated the Taliban’s capacity to wage a sustained insurgency across two decades. Though pushed from power in 2001, the Taliban never fully disappeared. They continuously modified their strategies and kept up cross-border networks, particularly in Pakistan’s tribal areas. As Antonio Giustozzi points out, their ability to adapt and blend contemporary communications, local negotiations, and ideological messaging to stay ingrained in rural Afghan life was just as important as their military tenacity, . By contrast, the Afghan government failed to establish a connection with the rural majority and remained confined to urban enclaves.

Many communities turned to the Taliban’s informal systems not for ideological reasons, but just for basic governance. Because state legal systems were inaccessible, corrupt, or simply unavailable, the villagers had to frequently turn to Taliban courts. In these regions, the Taliban appeared to be the only actors capable of resolving disputes swiftly and predictably. This form of parallel governance ensured their persistence and eventual re-emergence as a dominant force.

Structural Blindness and the Limits of Liberal Interventionism

Looking back, it is clear that the fall of the Afghan government was not caused by a single event. It was the outcome of a long process. The military was built on false numbers and untrustworthy systems. Instead of local accountability, the government was shaped by patronage and outside funding. Furthermore, the peace agreement granted the Taliban political recognition without demanding redress. Scholars like Barnett Rubin and Sarah Chayes had long cautioned that the Afghan state lacked fundamental components like real ownership of reforms, functioning justice systems, and public trust.

An important lesson for the future can be learned from the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan. It is insufficient to establish powerful armies or heavily funded ministries. Real political legitimacy must originate internally. It cannot be obtained through military training or foreign funding. Peacebuilding must support inclusive, transparent, and long-lasting institutions rather than negotiating with powerful elites or concentrating solely on short-term security solutions which the United states clearly faltered in.

The Afghanistan Analysts Network experts have long pointed out the blind spots in donor-led reform, such as the disregard for rural voices, the risks of over-centralization by the elite, and the disregard for traditional dispute resolution procedures that were accepted by Afghans. Despite decades of input from international advisors and Afghan civil society, reforms were frequently implemented top-down, following foreign models rather than taking into account local political realities. As a result, the United States established a fragile, outside-supported government rather than a stable democracy.

Conclusion

Afghanistan’s experience serves as a reminder that if the fundamental needs of justice, inclusion, and trust are not met, even the best-funded and well-meaning initiatives may fall short. No matter how much money is spent or how many troops are deployed, a system that does not reflect the will of its people will eventually fail.

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