CICS BLOG

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF PANCHAYATI RAJ INSTITUTIONS

An examination of the historical events that prevailed before the establishment of VC and PRI will help us have a better understanding of the prevailing power dynamics that currently exist, on one hand, between Panchayati Raj Institutions and state governments and parastatal bodies; and, on the other hand, between Village Committees and township governments.

Rural Local Governments in India have had a long history. The presence of self-governing village communities in India dates back to the Rig Veda i.e. approximately 1200 BC. The Panchayats or informally known as self-governing village communities means an assembly of five persons . It usually consists of five elderly, nominated persons, vested with sacred authority and with judicial and executive powers.

During the Medieval and Islamic periods, the characteristics of the village Panchayats remained more or less unaltered. However, a newer form of ‘modern’ local governments or PRI’s were invented during the Indian imperial rule so that Britishers could penetrate deep into the countryside and keep surveillance on the rural areas as well. The local government framework established during the colonial rule was an imposition that was above and far from democratic. It was meant to function as an extension of the imperial system of governance and it remained disconnected from the other existing social institutions and community-based organizations.

It is vital to note here that Britishers never set-up the Panchayati Raj institutions with the purpose of democratizing local governance. They were just meant to ease the administrative burden on them. PRI always remained distant from the people and the people never considered PRI as their own institution.

After India gained Independence in 1947, Mahatma Gandhi feverously argued for Gram Swaraj (village self-rule) and expected its incorporation in the Indian Constitution. He envisaged Indian polity to be based on communitarian principles where the real power vested with the villages or panchayats which acted as the legislative assemblies at the grass-root level. The national legislatures, in turn, derived their power from these grass-root organizations.

This scheme of governance, Gandhi believed, would lead to a superstructure composed of individuals as the integral unit necessary for the survival of the superstructure. The legislative power would be uniformly divided among the people themselves who would have one vote and democratically elect their representatives. Since individuals are necessary for the survival of and are in fact the basic building blocks of the superstructure, the superstructure would never crush them or deprive them of their strength. Instead, it would derive its own strength from the individuals. This would, in the words of Gandhi, “ultimately lead to the ideal of self-governed community life.” In these villages, the masses would be indirect and ultimate control of the means of production and they would pool their resources and divide their profits. This would replace the competition of capitalism with the struggle for mutual service and mutual existence. His ideas were in stark opposition to the competing political party system where governance is based on competition rather than cooperation and is determined by the concentration of power.

However, his idea met with a strong resistance from leaders like Dr. B.R. Ambedkar in the Constituent Assembly who were acutely aware of the identity based and caste-based politics of the Indian villages. They apprehended that village rule would only result in further subjugation and oppression of the minority group such as Dalits and SCs and STs. Also, after Independence, India rushed into modernity by following Nehru’s modernization model which trumped the Gandhian Socialist model. Nehru believed modernization was necessary if India were ever to achieve its aim of social equality and fight economic deprivation, then it must develop and progress rapidly. A decentralized governance framework would only impede planned economic development. Lastly, leaders at the time of our independence were more concerned with the unity and integrity of India and less concerned about how much power flowed to the villages.

Therefore, the idea of village panchayats was not included in the draft Constitution and but instead it was added as a Directive Principle of the State Policy enshrined in Article 40 of the Indian Constitution, 1950. Article 40 directed the states to organize village panchayats and bestow them with such power and authority that would enable them to function as units of self-governance.

Later, during the tenure of Indian former Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi, two committees (namely G.V.K Rao Committee and L.M. Singhvi Committee) were appointed to study the existing administrative system at the local level and also to regenerate PRI system. Based on the recommendations of the L.M. Singhvi Committee, the then Prime Minister Narsimha Rao passed the Panchayat Raj Bill which was passed by both the Houses of the Parliament with near unanimity. This bill subsequently became the Constitutional 73rd Amendment and it incorporated all the recommendations of the L.M. Singhvi Committee. The 73rd Amendment inserted in the Indian Constitution, Part IX, which relates to the Panchayats. Part IX provides for Gram Sabha in a village or group of villages; the constitution of Panchayats at the village and other level or levels; direct elections to all seats in Panchayats at the village and intermediate level amongst other things. Further, Article 243E provides that village elections for Panchayats shall be held every five years and Article 243C provides for direct elections for the Panchayats.

Almost century after the British rule, our Constitutional makers were left believing that PRIs was merely an appendage of the superior governments (British government at that time), functioning only for the state government, implementing its programs, policies. Therefore, our Constitutional makers even failed to consider as to whether the democracy should be extended to the governance of the strata below the ‘state’.

The Republic of China was established on October 1, 1949, when Mao Zedong declared it a “people’s democratic dictatorship.” At the time of establishment, its dictators adopted a Soviet-style governance pattern largely based on the petty peasant economy. They abandoned any efforts that could potentially disrupt its ruling order (owing to Confucianism ideology), and the country repeatedly tested many new governance mechanisms without relying on some predetermined blueprint or as Deng Xiaoping called it, “crossing the river while feeling the rocks.”

During the traditional period i.e. after 1949, China had a strongly centralized and planned rather than a market-oriented economy. It adopted the Soviet urban-rural dualistically biased government pattern and it formulated policies that favored the cities/ urban agglomerates and gave impetus to the industries. For example, China’s First Five Year Plan allocated 90 percent of the planned investment for industrial consumption and only 10 percent for agriculture which, at that time, accounted for 80 percent of national productional value. Similarly, to support the manufacturing sector in the cities, the agricultural prices were artificially set very low so that the wealth could be redistributed in favor of the urban areas to be used by the industries.

This Soviet urban-rural duality also created a chasm between the urban areas and the countryside. Since the whole country was governed by a single party having different government sectors, the rural area largely remained outside the purview of the party administrative. While the government remained a powerful ruling force in the urban areas, the rural areas remained absconded from the party’s control and the imperial power did not extend to the villages. Maintaining and safeguarding rural order then became the primary affair of the informal institutions which became more powerful than the formal institutions. The Collectivization period began around 1955 exposing the vices of Soviet styled governance pattern as well as the Stalinist heavy-industry-oriented development strategy.

The growth rate of the agriculture sector remained paltry at 2.7 percent. People from rural areas migrated to urban areas

in search of employment in the industrial sector because it was the only profit-earning enterprise. However, industries such as chemical industries could not create many jobs because they were capital intensive. Most importantly, many high-ranking officials prudently started questioning Mao’s Soviet styled governance pattern. Thereafter, from 1958 to 1978, people’s commune structure provided the framework for rural development throughout China. Under the Commune system, households were organized into teams, the teams were formed into brigades and brigades formed the commune. The commune system was expected to bring economic growth by tapping into the general surplus available in the countryside and then using it as an investment for the industries.

Formal institutions exerted pressure on informal institutions and even completely displaced them. The state was able to exercise control over the rural population through its agents and collective organizations and also appropriate their goods and properties. Over time, the coercive planning and control by the statelessness to excessive deprivation and severance of otherwise strong kinship ties among the rural families allowing the state to exert strong control of the countryside and also led to erosion of informal institutions.

The collectivization period subsequently paved the way for the urban-rural integration period. The strong foothold that the formal institutions had been exerting on the informal institutions weakened and the formal institutions became less effective than for carrying out the task of rural governance. China witnessed historical changes in its official strategy to improve rural governance. Committed to reversing the trend of this urban-rural divide, the policymakers in the 16th Congress party meeting held in 2002 declared that “socio-economic prosperity must incorporate urban and rural alike” and a new national policy called the “coordinated urban-rural development” policy was formalized. Following this, series of goals intended to promote urban-rural integration was passed in several high-level meetings such as the fifth plenary session of the 16th Central Committee of the CCP in 2005, the 17th National Congress of the CCP in 2007, etc. This zeal to combat the urban-rural divide could also be found in very recent Chinese policy decisions such as the 13th Five Year Plan (2016-2020) which builds upon the 11th and 12 Five Year Plan and the National Plan on New Urbanization (2014-2020) to bridge the gap between urban and rural residents. The plan envisaged, among other things, creation of 50 million urban jobs (the plan considers this a binding target) and mitigation of spatial distances and improving urban access for rural centers by creating intercity regional transportation networks such as the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei megaregion, the Yangtze River Delta, the Pearl River Delta, middle Yangtze River region, Chengdu-Chongqing region, and Shandong Peninsula ; the 2008 station council circular on rural reforms calling for achieving rural-urban integration.

Thus, in the aftermath of the collectivization period, the state sought to strengthen the rural governance by giving autonomy to the villages but, at the same time, augmenting its already existing institutions by exploring alternative arrangements of rural governance such as town committees. With the collapse of the Commune system and decentralization of land management rights, the village system became an important source of rural administration

The Chinese Constitution of 1982 gave the VC’s status of mass autonomous organizations. It also clarified the legal status of the township government. In 1987, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress adopted the Organic Law of the Village Committee (Trial) and revised it in 1998, 2010 and 2018.

However, the Organic Law has failed to foreshadow a complete withdrawal of the state. For ex., Article 4 and 6 states that VC’s will not only manage village affairs but they will also fulfill the tasks that are assigned to them by the higher levels. The Organic Law has used words like ‘guidance, support, and assistance’ to define the relationship between VC and townships. This indicates that the legislation only imagined the village committees as playing the role of a facilitator and not that of a provider. However, such distinctions are regularly downplayed by the township policy formulators who treat the committees as their own personal implementing bodies.

The biggest roadblock that Indian Panchayat Raj bodies face is the virtual absence of a decentralized federal structure. In 1993, the Parliament passed the 73rd Constitutional Amendment after realizing that the Panchayats and Nagar Palikas has existed for long but have never truly enjoyed real decentralized power. On paper, the amendment promises to empower the PRI by granting them unfettered executive authority over certain subjects mentioned in the Eleventh Schedule of the Constitution. However, in reality, the states have circumvented the spirit of the amendment by only empowering the Panchayat Raj Institutions to the extent that it is necessary to implement the strict letter of the law. For example, most of the states have delegated only traditional civic functions rather than developmental responsibilities to the PRIs. Thus, despite the amendment, PRI’s have remained transfixed as mere creatures of state governments devoid of any political legitimacy or decision-making power. They merely act as implementing agencies of the state governments and within the bounds set by state and central governments.

To make the matter worse, the position of the PRI is further weakened by the creation of a large number of parastatal bodies. Parastatal bodies are state-wide autonomous organizations that have been established by the state governments to carry out even local level functions such as water supply, sanitation which are otherwise within the functional domain of the PRIs . For instance, the Finance Development and Housing Corporations which are set up for the betterment of SCs, STs, the backward classes, women, and minorities invariably deal with subjects that have been assigned to the PRIs under the Eleventh schedule. Certain states such as Andhra Pradesh have become particularly hostile to the interests of PRIs. Andhra Pradesh has recently started a poverty reduction program known as ‘Janmabhoomi’. Poverty alleviation measures squarely fall within the functional domain of PRIs under Article 243W. Such devolution of functions of PRIs to the parastatal bodies and government-sponsored schemes leads to dilution of power and autonomy of the panchayats.

China has undergone a remarkable transformation in the manner in which its village elections are now conducted in different provinces. Many meaningful changes have been made concerning steering committees, voter registrations, candidate nominations, campaigning, secret balloting, and proxy voting. For instance, Fujian has eliminated of proxy voting in and Chinese provinces of Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Jiangxi and rural Chongqing are conducting direct elections without prior selection of formal candidates since 2004.

However, we must be mindful that by putting in place certain safeguards to elections such as elimination of proxy voting, use of ballot boxes, free campaigning and other procedural rules governing conduct of elections are necessary for preventing any subterfuge during the elections, still these procedural safeguards does not always translate into free, fair and transparent functioning of the elected representatives and the committees. It is a very dangerous proposition to conflate procedural safeguards during elections with complete independence and autonomy in functioning post-elections. This is because democratization depends on the power configuration in which elected bodies and elected representatives are embedded. To reiterate O’Brien and Han, “Putting grassroots democracy into place goes well beyond getting the procedures right, and ‘high quality’ democracy rests on much more than convening good village elections every three years.”

Just like India, China has failed in fully empowering its Village Committees. Chinese VCs are constantly engaged in a tug-of-war with the Township governments, Village Party branches and other social forces such as clans, criminal gangs, and religious organizations for seeking their share of power and legitimacy.

The township authorities which represent the state have many opportunities to negatively influence the grassroots governance. VCs are regularly expected to complete unwanted tasks assigned by higher levels such as meet unreasonable targets, collecting levies, etc. Village committee members also depend upon the townships for financial aid. Village Party branches also play a significant role in affecting the dominance of VC through their control over collective resources Article 3 of the Organic Law itself insists that village branches are a village’s ‘leadership core’. Therefore, naturally, the Party leaders play a dominant role in most locations.

Democratic rule by VC can be impeded by religious organizations and village clans as well. Religious organizations compete with village committees for resources or leadership in community affairs and clashes between different clans can lead to fierce conflict making governance nearly impossible.

Still, despite their shortcomings, Chinese village elections have conjured up the active participation of the citizens in the decision-making process. VCs are no more perceived as toothless institutions completely nonchalant to the woes of the common masses. In fact, in a recent survey conducted in 2018, around 92 percent of those surveyed believed that their community governance was truly democratic. On the other hand, about 42 percent believed that the real constrain to democratic decentralization was the low amount of participation by the residents. Around 79 percent of the residents believed that residents participated actively in the decision-making regarding community affairs.

Before contrasting the achievement of grassroot democracy in India and China, it is important to note the unlike India, China does not follow the Western democratic model. Chinese leaders qualify the kind of democracy they’re after as a “socialist democracy.” Indian leaders, on the other hand, have chosen a democratic form of governance modeled on the British Parliamentary model. As a result, a democratic criterion that can be applied in India may not be equally applicable in China. Therefore, if we have to judge the extent of democratization in the Chinese VC elections, we must do so keeping in mind the history of China and the words of President Jiang Zemin when he said: "Expanding basic-level democracy and guaranteeing the democratic rights of the peasants are not only the most extensive realization of socialist democracy in the country …” The real exercise of power in the case of both VCs and PRIs is both very agonizing and disappointing, although improving. In a survey conducted in China, it was found that almost a majority of the citizenry surveyed still believe that VCs do not have either the power or the resources to govern and their role was understood as serving the township governments, and Village bodies. 38% of the villagers expected VCs to perform the tasks handed down by the township governments and VCs are still considered as juniors in their dealings with the Village Political bodies and township governments are still in a predominant position in ensuring that VCs carry out government tasks.
In a similar vein, Article 243G which enjoins upon the PRIs such powers and authority as may be necessary to enable them to function as institutions of self-governance also paradoxically state that it is the state legislations which are responsible for making provisions and delegating powers to the PRIs.

Thus, the status quo concerning democratic decentralization is equally grim in both countries. However, given the historical backdrop of both the rural governing bodies, the author asserts that China has been more successful in empowering its local rural governance institutions and ushering a spirit of grass-root democracy in its rural areas. Despite being the Socialist Republic and despite being under a Single Party Rule for over 70 years, China has been able to successfully ignite and pursue its vision of grass-root governance despite having no experience with democratic institutions.
On the other hand, India has not been able to revive the lost glory of its PRI which they enjoyed before the British Rule. This is although India is not alien to the concept of democracy. In fact, out of all the countries, India was among the earliest to adopt local self-governing institutions and preserve their longevity. It has also benefited from the abundant guidance of veteran political leaders and thinkers like Mahatma Gandhi. Informal institutions have always existed on the Indian soil since the time of Rig Vedas. (Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this essay are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the ones of the Center for India-China Studies.)

“Subject to the provisions of this Constitution the Legislature of a State may, by law, endow the Panchayats with such powers and authority and may be necessary to enable them to function as institutions of self-government and such law may contain provisions for the devolution of powers and responsibilities upon Panchayats, at the appropriate level, subject to such conditions as may be specified therein, with respect to—"