Centre for Northeast Asian Studies
The 21st century, oft referred to as the Asian century in international politics is so called owing to the rise of powerful economies from what was once seen as the ‘Orient’. Countries in Northeast Asia, be it the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Japan, Republic of China (ROC)/ Taiwan, South Korea or North Korea exert myriad types of influences on the international system. The various types of relationships among the countries of the Northeast Asian region also impact international politics as these range from conflicts over disputed islands, espionage, perceived historical injustices such as the Nanjing massacre to rising volumes of trades in the region to potential nuclear crises to balancing between acts of cooperation and conflict.
The history, culture, society and politics, all of which are different from that of the Western world become interesting aspects of study as all of these impact the posturing of the countries of the region in their respective foreign policies. Given the fact that India has active conflicts as well as partnerships with countries of the region, a better understanding of Northeast Asia from the lenses of security to economics to diplomacy to culture becomes pertinent.
The Center for Northeast Asian Studies looks at the countries of the region with fine lenses to offer understandings beyond what is provided by Western literature and theories of international politics. Tools such as track 2 discussions, seminars, lectures, primary research, historical and archival studies, along with a reliance on the languages of the region are used to understand international relations.
- To engage with key themes and theories of international politics with a particular focus on those from Northeast Asia.
- Provide and understanding og regional geopolitical dynamics.
- Collaborative research and knowledge exchange between the Centre and host institutions.
- To act as a repository for scholars of Northeast Asian studies.
- To move beyond the binaries of conflict and cooperation and understand the dynamics of the region through analyses which encompass not just cooperation and conflict but also history, culture, society, migration.
- In addition to providing understandings of foreign policy, to develop interest among students in the individual countries of the region; to understand how domestic events unfold.
- To contribute to discourses that shape India’s approaches to the countries of the region.
- Promotion of ideas, people and knowledge.
- Maintain a database of maps of conflict areas of the region
- To teach students the importance of using the language of a country to reach more accurate analyses and to move away from mere Western understandings of international politics.
- Commentaries
- Newsletters
- Articles
- Research projects
- Podcasts
a) Chinese Foreign Policy
b) People’s Republic of China before and after World War II
c) Cross-strait Relations between Taiwan and China
d) Politics of East Asia
e) Taiwan: History, Culture and Politics
Book Chapters:
Pathak, Sriparna (2021) “The Chinese Concept of Sovereignty and the India-China Border Dispute”, in Re-Imagining Border Studies in South Asia edited by Dr. Dhananjay Tripathi, Routledge, ISBN 9781032189482.
- Pathak, Sriparna (2021) “Xi Jinping’s China Dream and the future graph of the Chinese economy”, in Chinese Politics and Foreign Policy Under Xi Jinping, edited by Arthur S. Ding and Dr. Jagannath P. Panda, Routledge, ISBN 9780367470289.
- Pathak, Sriparna (2020) “China’s Relations with South Asia in a COVID-19 World Order” in China and COVID-19: Domestic and External Dimensions, edited by Professor Srikanth Kondapalli and Shaheli Das, Pentagon Press, ISBN
- Pathak, Sriparna (2020) “1962 and After” in One Mountain Two Tigers, edited by Shakti Sinha, Pentagon Press.
- Pathak, Sriparna (2020) “Sino-Indian Economic Relations: Cooperation or Conflict?” in India and China: Economics and Soft Power Diplomacy, edited by Geeta Kochhar and Snehal Ajit Ulman, Routledge, ISBN 9780367335557
- Pathak, Sriparna (2019) “India, China and the U.S. in the Indian Ocean: A Strategic Triangle to Counter Piracy?”, in Indian Ocean: The New Frontier (2019), edited by Kousar Azam, Routledge, ISBN
- Pathak, Sriparna (2019) “Neorealism, China and the 21st Century”, in International Relations: Theories and Approaches (2019), edited by Siddharth Tripathi, Worldview Publishers, ISBN 9789382267327.
Online Publications:
- Article in Khabarhub, Nepal titled, “Standing up to Chinese Bullying the Lithuanian Way”, dated September 28, 2021.
- Issue Brief for Vivekananda International Forum, New Delhi titled, “The Chinese Hand Behind Terrorism in Northeast India”, August 2021 issue, dated August 19, 2021.
- Article in Science, Technology and Security Forum, Manipal University titled, “China’s Tech Crackdown: Why Now?”, dated August 19, 2021.
- Article in Science, Technology and Security Forum, Manipal University titled, “The Henan Floods, 2021 and China’s Narrative Creation”, dated July 27, 2021.
- Pathak, Sriparna (2021), “The Henan Floods, 2021 and China’s Narrative Creation”, Science, Technology and Security Forum, Manipal University, July 27, 2021, URL: https://stsfor.org/content/henan-floods-2021-and-chinas-narrative-creation
- Pathak, Sriparna (2020), “Upgrading Economic Ties With Taiwan Suits India Better”, News 21, October 27, 2020, URL: https://thenews21.com/upgrading-india-taiwan-economic-ties-suits-india-better
- Pathak, Sriparna (2020), “Escalating conflicts between China and the US — Not just about Trump’s reelection?”, Observer Research Foundation, August 12, 2020, URL: https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/escalating-conflicts-between-china-and-the-us/
- Pathak, Sriparna (2020), “Diplomatic Doublespeak and Chinese Foreign Policy”, Nepal Institute for International Cooperation and Engagement, July 25, 2020, URL: https://niice.org.np/archives/5595
- Pathak, Sriparna (2020), “Domestic Imperatives Behind Chinese Aggression at the India-China Border in 2020”, Institute of Chinese Studies, July 24, 2020, URL: https://icsin.org/publications/domestic-imperatives-behind-chinese-aggression-at-the-india-china-border-in-2020
- Pathak, Sriparna (2020), “Why Now? The India-China Confrontation at Galwan”, 9DashLine, June 23, 2020, URL: https://www.9dashline.com/article/why-now-the-india-china-confrontation-at-galwan?fbclid=IwAR2oqmnGcIk1N97onlmIRjZdrxtDxWmYLIolsmUjzlgJndgBzP2gAxNSbVQ
- Pathak, Sriparna (2020), “Managing Employment and Migrant Labour in a COVID19 World: Lessons from China”, India Foundation, April 22, 2020, URL: https://indiafoundation.in/articles-and-commentaries/managing-employment-and-migrant-labour-in-a-covid19-world-lessons-from-china/?fbclid=IwAR2i_tQhNnYcrZ_VClCUMdKkWS-jiBK4nIlWt_mL-tVk3gFKcolplseTm4A
- Pathak, Sriparna (2020), titled, “COVID-19 and the end of Democracy?”, The Geopolitics April 11,2020, URL: https://thegeopolitics.com/covid-19-and-the-end-of-democracy/?fbclid=IwAR1CCw2tlnPMI9sOorD-biVcqgHqng1pTQwTti0iVhgozmhF1K_OnxDvOWQ
- Pathak, Sriparna (2020), “The Test of Covid-19: China Pakistan Relations”, The Geopolitics, dated April 5, 2020, URL: https://thegeopolitics.com/the-test-of-covid-19-china-pakistan-relations/?fbclid=IwAR2-i_5QNw9jFem18DxBfM5IQdTGRhvBSw3cpS2Yurgbbgz_T5r0dldGasc
- Pathak, Sriparna (2020), “The Failure of China’s COVID19 Diplomacy in South Asia”, Nepal Institute for International Cooperation and Engagement, April 05, 2020, URL: https://niice.org.np/archives/3914?fbclid=IwAR21IFZDVfc00smJvRbVAWQiHN0xAsYwVYd7Sg5GHAa3b_IQZAGHWearqwk
- Pathak, Sriparna (2020), titled, “5g Trials and Security Risks for India”, Science, Technology and Security Forum, Manipal University, March 18, 2020, URL: http://stsfor.org/content/5g-trials-and-security-risks-india?fbclid=IwAR1TpY3aF2kN8q0vsM61KUQIc8bbwpjVeO_WgblZ50V4q9_EFY7MXWh8Ta8
- Pathak, Sriparna (2020), , titled, “Can the BRI Solve China’s Economic Woes?”, The Asia Dialogue, University of Nottingham, Asia Research Institute, February 19, 2020, URL: https://theasiadialogue.com/2020/02/19/can-the-bri-resolve-chinas-economic-woes/
- Pathak, Sriparna (2019), “The Return of the Rajapaksas, the ‘Debt Trap’ and India”, South Asia Democratic Forum, , Number 162 (2019), ISSN 2406-5617 December 10, 2019, URL: https://www.academia.edu/41273364/The_Return_of_the_Rajapaksas_the_Debt_Trap_and_India
- Pathak, Sriparna (2019), “China’s Hostage Diplomacy”, The Geopolitics, May 24, 2019, URL: https://thegeopolitics.com/chinas-hostage-diplomacy/
- Pathak, Sriparna (2019), titled, “India Needs to Prepare for China’s Growing Espionage Threat”, Science, Technology and Security Forum, Manipal University, May 9, 2019, URL: http://stsfor.org/content/india-needs-prepare-chinas-growing-espionage-threat
Editorials/ Newspaper Articles
- Editorial in the Economic Times titled, “Information as Weapon: Understanding the false news of the Nipah outbreak in India”, dated July 13, 2021.
- Editorial in India News, Queensland titled, “Why Disengage? Decoding China’s Motivations at Galwan”, dated March 2, 2021.
- People Speak in the Assam Tribune titled “What would be the best way to push back China?”, dated July 19, 2020.
- Editorial in the Assam Tribune titled, “Childhood in a COVID-19 World”, dated April 26,2020.
- Editorial in the Economic Times titled, “Ready for a Chinese Return of Serve”, dated April 21, 2020.
Anushka Saxena
- Saxena, Anushka (2021). Access to Justice and the Rohingyas: From a Court Case to a Coup Crisis. Global South Studies Series, Jindal Centre for the Global South: https://globalsouthseries.in/jindal-centre-for-the-global-south-jcgs/.
- Saxena, Anushka (2021). Competing for Resource: India-China Rivalry in Central Asia. Modern Diplomacy: https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2021/09/02/competing-for-resource-india-china-rivalry-in-central-asia/.
- Saxena, Anushka (2021). Red Tourism and CCP Centennial: What they show and what we see. The JSIA Bulletin: https://www.thejsiabulletin.com/post/red-tourism-and-ccp-centennial-what-they-show-and-what-we-see.
- Saxena, Anushka (2021). History through a Fissionable Lens : 35 Years of the Chernobyl Disaster. Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses: https://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/chernobyl-disaster-asaxena-100621.
- Saxena, Anushka (2021). Legalities and Technicalities of Unmanned Marine Systems. Kalinga Institute of Indo-Pacific Studies: http://www.kiips.in/research/legalities-and-technicalities-of-unmanned-marine-systems/.
Anushka Saraswat
- Saraswat, Anushka (2021). Afghanistan’s Uncertain Future and its Implications for China-Pakistan Relations, Vivekananda International Foundation: https://www.vifindia.org/article/2021/august/11/afghanistan-s-uncertain-future-and-its-implications-for-china-pakistan-relations
- Saraswat, Anushka (2021). The Social Media Dilemma: From Capitalism to National Security, Vivekananda International Foundation: https://www.vifindia.org/2021/may/28/the-social-media-dilemma-from-capitalism-to-national-security
- Saraswat, Anushka (2021). The Israel Lobby and the U.S. Foreign Policy: A Book Review, the Diplomatist Magazine: https://diplomatist.com/2021/05/24/the-israel-lobby-and-the-u-s-foreign-policy-a-book-review/
- Saraswat, Anushka (2021). Book Review: The Hundred Year Marathon, the Diplomatist Magazine. ISSN
- Saraswat, Anushka (2020). Understanding the National Intelligence Law of China: Why India Banned Tik Tok, the Diplomatist Magazine: https://diplomatist.com/2020/09/05/understanding-the-national-intelligence-law-of-china-why-india-banned-tik-tok/
- Saraswat, Anushka (2020). Cyber Terrorism and Social Media Weaponization, Jindal Centre for the Global South: https://globalsouthseries.in/2020/08/28/cyber-terrorism-and-social-media-weaponization/
- Saraswat, Anushka (2020). The Virus of Racism: An Overview of Racism in the Contemporary World, the Global Citizens Blog: https://globalcitizensjgu.wordpress.com/2020/08/14/the-virus-of-racism-an-overview-of-racism-in-the-contemporary-world/
- Saraswat, Anushka (2020). Animal Spirits Review, FERC, Hansraj College, University of Delhi: https://www.ferchansraj.org/post/add-a-catchy-title
- Saraswat, Anushka (2020). Dragon in the Himalayas: China’s Water Hegemony, the Diplomatist Magazine: https://diplomatist.com/2020/06/03/dragon-in-the-himalayas-chinas-water-hegemony/
- Saraswat, Anushka (2020) An Overview of Human Rights Violation in Xinjiang, the Modern Diplomacy: https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2020/05/03/an-overview-of-human-rights-violation-in-xinjiang/
- Saraswat, Anushka (2020). Covid-19: A Clash of Faith and Social Distancing, the Diplomatist Magazine: https://diplomatist.com/2020/04/18/covid-19-a-clash-of-faith-and-social-distancing/
- Saraswat, Anushka (2020). Chinese Interests in Afghanistan: From Indifference to Strategic Involvement, the Diplomatist Magazine: https://diplomatist.com/2020/04/17/chinese-interests-in-afghanistan-from-indifference-to-strategic-involvement/
- Saraswat, Anushka (2020). COVID-19: Universities Are Filling the Void in International Cooperation, the Geopolitics Magazine: https://thegeopolitics.com/covid-19-universities-are-filling-the-void-in-international-cooperation/
- Saraswat, Anushka (2020). The Test of Covid-19: China-Pakistan Relations, the Geopolitics Magazine: https://thegeopolitics.com/the-test-of-covid-19-china-pakistan-relations/
Anubhav Shankar
- Goswami, S. Anubhav (2021). Taiwan’s ‘Porcupine strategy’ for cross-strait deterrence explained. Centre for Northeast Asian Studies: https://jgu.edu.in/jsia/centre-for-northeast-asian-studies/
- Goswami, S. Anubhav (2021). Sri Lanka’s discarded balancing act between India and China explained. Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs. Air University Press:https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/2803695/sri-lankas-discarded-balancing-act-between-india-and-china-explained/
- Goswami, S. Anubhav (2021). India-Iran: Maximise National Interests. Defence and Security Alert (ISO 9001:2015 certified Defence magazine): https://www.dsalert.org/DSA-Editions/2021/DSA_Aug_Anubhav_Shankar_Goswami.pdf
- Goswami, S. Anubhav (2020). US Takes First Step towards Recognizing Tibetan Government-in-Exile: The Myth of Historic Chinese Suzerainty over Tibet. Vivekananda International Foundation: https://www.vifindia.org/2020/december/29/us-takes-first-step-towards-recognizing-Tibetan-government-in-exile.
- Goswami, S. Anubhav (2020). US Support for Uighurs and India’s Interest. Chintan-India Foundation Blogs: https://chintan.indiafoundation.in/articles/us-support-for- uighurs-and-indias-interest/.
- Goswami, S. Anubhav (2020). India-U.S. Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership — At the backdrop of a new Great game at the Indo- Pacific Region. Indian Manifesto: https://indianmanifesto.in/opinion/f/india-us-comprehensive- global-strategic-partnership.
- Goswami, S. Anubhav (2020) Can India make the most out of the growing Arab- Israeli rapprochement?. The Kootneeti, https://thekootneeti.in/2020/09/21/can-india-make-the-most-out-of-the-growing-arab- israeli-rapprochement/.
Divyanshu Jindal
- Jindal, Divyanshu (2020), “Climate Change Action or Economic Recovery? It’s the Economy, Stupid.” The Asian Institute of Diplomacy and International Affairs. URL: https://www.aidiaasia.org:443/research-article/climate-change-action-or-economic-recovery-it-s-the-economy-stupid
- Jindal, Divyanshu (2020), “COVID-19: Effects on Global South Economies Lessons from the Pandemic on Foreign Dependence.” Global South Studies Series. URL: https://globalsouthseries.in/2020/04/28/covid-19-effects-on-global-south-economies-lessons-from-the-pandemic-on-foreign-dependence/
- Jindal, Divyanshu (2020), “Eurasian Economic Union: A Model for Foresight into The Russian Foreign Policy in the 21st Century.” Diplomatist, URL: https://diplomatist.com/2020/07/30/eurasian-economic-union-a-model-for-foresight-into-the-russian-foreign-policy-in-the-21st-century/
- Jindal, Divyanshu (2020), “How Global South Is Coordinating against Covid-19: What the North Can Learn.” Global South Studies Series, URL: https://globalsouthseries.in/2020/04/05/collaboration-co-operation-and-the-costs-involved-between-countries-and-who-2/
- Jindal, Divyanshu (2020), “Rising Barriers to Indian Soft Power in Afghanistan.” Modern Diplomacy, URL: https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2020/11/06/rising-barriers-to-indian-soft-power-in-afghanistan/
- Jindal, Divyanshu (2020), “Russia: The 21st Century Diplomat That South Asia Needs.” The Asian Institute of Diplomacy and International Affairs, URL: https://www.aidiaasia.org:443/research-article/russia-the-21st-century-diplomat-that-south-asia-needs
- Jindal, Divyanshu (2020), “Russia: The Multi-Faceted Diplomat of the 21st Century.” Diplomatist. URL: https://diplomatist.com/2020/07/28/russia-the-multi-faceted-diplomat-of-the-21st-century/
- Jindal, Divyanshu (2020), “South Asia’s Future: The Biden Way.” The Asian Institute of Diplomacy and International Affairs, URL: https://www.aidiaasia.org:443/research-article/south-asia-s-future-the-biden-way
- Jindal, Divyanshu (2020), “Strengthening Defence Ties Between Russia and India: A Geo-Economical Perspective.” The Diplomatist, URL: https://diplomatist.com/2020/10/31/strengthening-defence-ties-between-russia-and-india-a-geo-economical-perspective/
- Jindal, Divyanshu (2021), “Can India-Russia Trade Triple by 2025?” BRICS Informational Portal, URL: https://infobrics.org/post/34200/.
- Jindal, Divyanshu (2021), “India at ZAPAD-2021: What It Means for Our Ties With Russia & China.” The Quint. URL: https://www.thequint.com/voices/opinion/india-russia-military-exercise-zapad-2021-geopolitical-implications.
- Jindal, Divyanshu (2021), “Indo-Russian S-400 Deal in Light of the US’ Afghanistan Predicament.” Modern Diplomacy, URL: https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2021/09/06/indo-russian-s-400-deal-in-light-of-the-us-afghanistan-predicament/
- Jindal, Divyanshu (2021), “Is Ukraine at War? Navigating Ukraine’s Geopolitical Conundrum.” Modern Diplomacy, URL: https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2021/06/10/is-ukraine-at-war-navigating-ukraines-geopolitical-conundrum/
- Jindal, Divyanshu (2021), “Russia, India and the S-400 Deal: Complicated Geopolitics.” 9DASHLINE. URL: https://www.9dashline.com/article/russia-india-and-the-s-400-deal-complicated-geopolitics
- Jindal, Divyanshu (2021), “Russian Far East and Arctic: Emerging Arenas for India-China Competition?” Modern Diplomacy, URL: https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2021/09/01/russian-far-east-and-arctic-emerging-arenas-for-india-china-competition/
- Jindal, Divyanshu (2021), “Russia’s Asian Age: The Permanent Pivot.” Modern Diplomacy. URL: https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2021/09/04/russias-asian-age-the-permanent-pivot/
- Jindal, Divyanshu (2021), “The Curious Case of Russian Cyberattacks in India.” Modern Diplomacy, URL: https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2021/09/28/the-curious-case-of-russian-cyberattacks-in-india/
- Jindal, Divyanshu (2021), “The Hydrogen Push: Mapping Indo-Russian Trajectories – Analysis.” Eurasia Review, URL: https://www.eurasiareview.com/23092021-the-hydrogen-push-mapping-indo-russian-trajectories-analysis/
- Jindal, Divyanshu (2021), “The Inevitable Geopolitical Dilemma of Climate Change.” Modern Diplomacy. URL: https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2021/06/13/the-inevitable-geopolitical-dilemma-of-climate-change/
- Jindal, Divyanshu (2021), “What Su-75 ‘Checkmate’ Means for Indo-Russian Relations.” Forum for Global Studies, URL: https://www.forumforglobalstudies.com/what-su-75-checkmate-means-for-indo-russian-relations/
- Jindal, Divyanshu, and Mahek Marwaha (2021), “Russia, China and EU Are Pushing Towards De-Dollarization: Will India Follow?” BRICS Informational Portal. URL: http://infobrics.org
- Jindal, Divyanshu, and Vishal Rajput (2021), “In the Afghanistan Arena, Russia Seems to Be India’s Only Hope Now.” The Quint. URL: https://www.thequint.com/voices/opinion/in-the-afghanistan-arena-russia-seems-to-be-indias-only-hope-now
- (2021, April). In pursuit of regaining momentum: India-Russia relations. Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Diplomatist, 9(4), 17–19.
- (2021, June). G7’s united stance against Russia and the narrowing space for India’s strategic hedging. Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Diplomatist, 9(6), 40–42.
Palak Maheshwari
- Presented a paper on “Atheist China’s Buddhist Soft Power” at NIICE International Studies Conference 2021. YouTube LINK of the panel.
- Maheshwari, Palak. “Recent Developments in Bilateral Relations between North and South Korea.” Diplomatist, 29 June 2020. LINK
- Maheshwari, Palak. “THE PRICE OF FASHION: BROWN BODIES IN THE THIRD WORLD.” JSIA Bulletin, 20 Feb. 2021. LINK
- Maheshwari, Palak. “Book Review: Shadow States: India, China and the Himalayas, 1910-1962.” The Kootneeti, 30 Apr. 2021. LINK
Dnyanashri
- Kulkarni, Dnyanashri (2021). Azadi ka Amrit Mahotsav and Cultural Diplomacy. Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Diplomatist. https://diplomatist.com/2021/10/14/azadi-ka-amrit-mahotsav-and-cultural-diplomacy/.
Yukti Panwar
- Panwar , Yukti. ‘Military Coup in Myanmar – A Twist to the Unknown’. Sun and Snow (blog), 9 March 2021. https://sunandsnow.in/2021/03/09/military-coup-in-myanmar-a-twist-to-the-unknown/.
- Panwar, Yukti. ‘Hindu Dharma: An Introduction’. Sun and Snow (blog), 31 January 2021. https://sunandsnow.in/2021/01/31/hindu-dharma-an-introduction/.
- Panwar, Yukti. ‘India in UNSC – What Does It Mean?’ Sun and Snow (blog), 2 January 2021. https://sunandsnow.in/2021/01/02/indiainunsc/.
- Panwar, Yukti. ‘“Pakistan PM Imran Khan Blames Clothes of Women for Rising Rapes” – With Some Twists and Turns’. The Social Talks , 13 July 2021. https://thesocialtalks.com/world/pakistan-pm-imran-khan-blames-clothes-of-women-for-rising-rapes-with-some-twists-and-turns/.
- Panwar, Yukti. ‘The Diana Interview of 1995: MPs to Question Former BBC Chiefs’. The Social Talks, 17 June 2021. https://thesocialtalks.com/world/the-diana-interview-of-1995-mps-to-question-former-bbc-chiefs/.
- Panwar, Yukti. ‘The Probable Expansion of G7 to G10 and Its Implications’. Sun and Snow (blog), 21 January 2021. https://sunandsnow.in/2021/01/21/the-probable-expansion-of-g7-to-g10-and-its-implications/.
- Panwar, Yukti. ‘US to Investigate on the Origins of Coronavirus: What Would It Mean for the Future?’ Sun and Snow (blog), 12 June 2021. https://sunandsnow.in/2021/06/12/us-to-investigate-on-the-origins-of-coronavirus-what-would-it-mean-for-the-future/.
- Panwar, Yukti. ‘Women In South Korea Are Mocking Men and Fuelling an Anti-Feminism Movement’. The Social Talks, 3 July 2021. https://thesocialtalks.com/world/women-in-south-korea-are-mocking-mens-penises-and-fuelling-an-anti-feminism-movement/.
- Panwar, Yukti. ‘IS HINDU-PHOBIA REAL ?’ AI, 27 October 2021. https://www.argumentativeindians.com/post/is-hindu-phobia-real.
Sukanya Bali
- Bali, Sukanya. ‘Alibaba then, Didi now: Three reasons why Beijing is going after its tech giants’ Global Politics, 11 September 2021.
http://globalpolitics.in/view_cir_articles.php?url=China%20Reader&recordNo=640
- Bali, Sukanya. ‘Tracing the Quad’s evolution in the last two decades’ Global Politics, 31 March 2021.
http://globalpolitics.in/view_cir_articles.php?url=NIAS%20GP%20Debate%20on%20Quad&recordNo=542
- Bali, Sukanya. ‘Thailand, the new abortion law poses more questions’ Global Politics, 21 February 2021.
Harsheen Sahni
- Sahni, Harsheen (2021). Biden’s Role in the Unravelling of the Afghanistan Crisis. Nickeled and Dimed, Centre of New Economic Studies: https://nickledanddimed.com/2021/09/16/bidens-role-in-the-unraveling-of-afghanistan-crisis/
- Sahni, Harsheen (2021). Book Review: The Economics of Small Things by Sudipta Sarangi. Nickeled and Dimed, Centre of New Economic Studies: https://nickledanddimed.com/2021/08/06/book-review-the-economics-of-small-things-by-sudipta-sarangi/
B.S Ashish
- Ashish, B.S. “All you need to know about Citizenship Amendment Act 2019.” JSIA Bulletin (2020). https://jsiabulletinjgu.wixsite.com/jsiabulletin/post/all-you-need-to-know-about-citizenship-amendment-act-2019
- Ashish, B.S. “Does ancient philosophy hold the key to understanding modern democracy?” Standpoint India (2021). https://standpointindia.in/does-ancient-philosophy-hold-the-key-to-understanding-modern-democracy/
- Ashish, B.S. “What makes Yemeni crisis one of a kind?” Standpoint India (2021).
Part 1 : https://standpointindia.in/what-makes-the-yemeni-crisis-one-of-a-kind-part-1/
Part 2 : https://standpointindia.in/what-makes-the-yemeni-crisis-one-of-a-kind-part-2/
- Ashish, B.S. “Power over Palestine – A century of standoff.” United Religions Initiative (2021). https://khwaeesh.in/2021/03/power-over-palestine-a-century-of-stand-off/
- Ashish, B.S. “The relevance of H-O trade in modern day international trade.” The Ordinary Mercantile (2021). https://db8a8226-b041-429f-b2c9-45f00d880775.filesusr.com/ugd/e89757_ed9bf8f865cc44e480c536919eb5b05c.pdf?index=true (Page 29)
- Ashish, B.S. “How was BJP juggernaut halted in TN, WB, and Kerala?” The Rise (2021). https://therise.co.in/7303/bjp-juggernaut-halted-in-2021/
- Ashish, B.S. “Is course correction needed in the election engine of BJP?” The Rise (2021). https://therise.co.in/7373/course-correction-needed-in-bjp/
- Ashish, B.S. “Expanding sphere of influence: China’s Interests in Afghanistan.” Geopolitical Influences Over Afghanistan: Centre for Security Studies (2021). https://jgu.s3.ap-south-1.amazonaws.com/jsia/Geopolitical+Influences+on+Afghanistan.pdf (Page 8)
Ashish, B.S. “Can Erdögan’s Turkey really help the Uighurs in Xinjiang?” The Kootneeti (2021). https://thekootneeti.in/2021/10/16/can-erdogans-turkey-really-help-the-uighurs-in-xinjiang/
Spillover Effect of Ukraine in East Asia
Ukraine’s invasion by Russian President Vladimir Putin might have led to a historic shift in East Asia and the rest of the world about their defence policies. While the Russian invasion of Ukraine is changing the post-Cold War status quo in Eastern Europe, East Asian countries are already facing a security impact and reconsidering their defence strategies and alliances. Against this backdrop, this article attempts to answer the pertinent question as to how the Russia-Ukraine conflict in Eastern Europe is reshaping East Asian geopolitics.
The Spillover Effect in East Asia
In international relations, Spillover Effect refers to when a seemingly unrelated event in a country affects other countries. Through the lenses of the concept of the Spillover Effect, one can rightly argue that the invasion of Ukraine by Russia has certainly played a crucial role in shaping the Presidential elections of South Korea.
While the world was focused on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and changing dynamics in the region, South Korean Presidential elections took place on 9 March 2022. Highlighting the country’s national security challenges, both, Lee Jae-Myung, the candidate of the ruling Democratic Party and the conservative candidate Yoon Suk-Yeol who narrowly won the election, addressed how Ukraine’s invasion is an important lesson for South Korea. As for Lee Jae-Myung, he emphasized how a defence policy independent of the United States was crucial for South Korea. On the other hand, Yoon Suk-Yeol called for advancing closer defence ties with the United States as a strategy to deter North Korea.
Interestingly, the Presidential candidate Lee was forced to apologize for making a statement like Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky “had caused a major clash by inciting Russia with a hasty promise of Ukraine’s NATO admission”. At the same time, Yoon too faced criticism as he posted a “We stand with Ukraine” meme on his social media. However, the populist Conservative candidate Yoon’s victory in the elections indicated the strengthening of the Seoul- Washington alliance as far as security ties are concerned.
Thus, another important factor affecting East Asia in the wake of the Ukraine crisis is the possibility of the United States deploying its missile defence systems on the soils of Japan, the Philippines and evidently, South Korea.
While the Russian forces initiated a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, leaders in China and Taiwan closely watch the situation unfold. In fact, the Taiwanese Foreign Ministry said it “strongly condemns” Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and will join international economic sanctions. Besides, Taiwan is also experiencing insecurities vis-à-vis Chinese military intervention. It is even portrayed as ‘Asian’ Ukraine by the western media. In Taiwan, the war in Ukraine is no longer seen as an armed conflict between two states, but as a struggle between liberal democracies and evil autocracies. However, The Taiwanese government stated, it is inappropriate to link Taiwan’s situation to that of Ukraine’s as the two are completely different and people should not try to manipulate the situation by saying “today’s Ukraine is tomorrow’s Taiwan“. While there were no unusual military movements by China, Taiwan, still, on the other hand, has stepped up its alert level.
A shift in Geopolitics
It is pertinent to mention that the sanctions on Russia announced by the United States on 28th February appears to have impacted East Asian Countries, especially China.
While several analysts had predicted that China will vote in favour of Russia at the UN General Assembly, China, however, surprisingly ‘Abstained’ from voting the resolution opposing the Russian military operation against Ukraine. Further, Beijing has announced $790,000 in humanitarian aid for war-torn Ukraine. Though China shares an expansionist vision, for China to achieve its ‘China Dream’, Xi Jinping is trying to maintain a neutral position. Besides, ever since China was gripped by the rising COVID-19 pandemic, China has increased its import of food, marine products and farm from Tokyo. It has been reported that there is a surge from 35.2% to 222.4 billion yen ($1.93 billion) in 2021.
Similarly, Mongolia, another country that shares a border with Russia is put in a tough spot, economically and diplomatically between East and West. Sharing borders with both China and Russia, Mongolia had adopted a ‘third neighbour’ diplomatic strategy through which it advanced ties with Japan and South Korea. Nonetheless, the Mongolian economy has been interdependent on its two giant neighbours. While Mongolia has traditionally kept itself out of geopolitical disputes, the more it is forced to take sides in the Russia-Ukraine crisis, the less opportunity it holds to counterbalance its position vis-à-vis Russian and Chinese influence on its economy.
Apart from the economic impact in the region, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has pushed countries to reassess their security ties. A debate in Japan is remerging as former President Shinzo Abe gave bold remarks about allowing the deployment of US nuclear weapons on Japanese soil similar to European NATO members. A question is rising whether Japan should continue with its pacificist constitution or reshape its defence strategy?
Furthermore, it is interesting to note that there is a rapid boost to the defence market against the backdrop of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. In fact, the global defense market size is expected to grow from $452.69 billion in 2021 to $483.47 billion in 2022 at a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 6.8%. However, as far as East Asia is concerned, the Russia-Ukraine conflict has certainly pushed countries to reassess their capabilities for asymmetrical warfare.[i]
[i] Asymmetrical warfare, unconventional strategies and tactics adopted by a force when the military capabilities of belligerent powers are not simply unequal but are so significantly different that they cannot make the same sorts of attacks on each other.
Dnyanashri Kulkarni
MA DLB 2020
Email: dnyanashrikulkarni@gmail.com 20jsia-dkulkarni@jgu.edu.in
(The views expressed are those of the author’s solely and do not represent those of the Centre for Northeast Asian Studies in any way)
Beijing Olympics 2022: A contradiction of Olympic values
By Aditi Maurya
(Author’s Bio: Aditi Maurya is a first year Master’s student of Diplomacy, Law and Business at the Jindal School of International Affairs. She holds a Bachelor’s degree in Political Science and History from Jai Hind College, University of Mumbai. Her research interests include Geopolitics, Regional Security, and Economic Diplomacy of North-East Asia.)
On 4th February 2022, the Beijing Olympics 2022 kicked off in a glamourous manner in Niǎocháo, the Mandarin word for Bird’s nest, the National Stadium in China. The event envisioned by Xi was to “not only enhance our confidence in realising the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation but show a good image of our country”. Under the weight of these enormous Chinese ambitions, the games are seeped deep into controversy, ceasing to represent what they stand for.
The games are a tradition dating back to 3,000 years, but the modern Olympics originates from the 19th Century when Baron Pierre de Coubertin’s proposal to revive the games after 1,500 years was accepted at the International Congress in Paris. He designed the five-ring emblem representing the unity of the five continents that participated in it, and the games were meant to be much more than just a competition. It created a safe space where differences would be kept aside to engage in friendship, inciting a philosophy of life drawing on the connections of body, will and mind. The spirit of the games enclosed freedom and solidarity, which contributed to a peaceful world. Never been about anything but fair play and harmony, these games did not intend to intertwine worldly affairs to bog down athletes’ feet. However, after being highly politicised over the years, the 2022 games witnessed a peak of transgression away from the ideals of its origin.
The prestige and eminence of the games dwindled as athletes accused the management of poor arrangements under the pretence of COVID-19 quarantine, which can point to bias and rigging of the games for the interest of Chinese players. South Korea also plans to file a lawsuit to the International Court of Arbitration for Sports over biased refereeing, which led to two of their world-record-holding short track speed skaters being disqualified. The authorities are most likely to obstruct any investigation into this accusation, considering even the International Olympic Committee (IOC) is busy aiding Beijing in smooth sailing, which was evident with the Peng Shuai debacle. Applications used to track infections among players being a compulsion to be installed on their devices have been deliberated to be embroiled in dubious surveillance, which led to athletes being advised to use burner phones and temporary emails. While such precautions may eliminate a few hazards, the risks entailing participation in the games have increased with China becoming more hostile with citizens of countries entangled in a conflict with Beijing. China’s hostage diplomacy very comprehensively demonstrates the escalating perils of being a foreigner in China. Therefore, the participating nations had to make a trade-off between their players’ safety to the tradition and the diplomatic connotation.
India was one of the nations that planned on participating in the Beijing Olympics, putting away long-time dissension to give way to a good game while western states followed the United States in diplomatic boycotts. However, Indian goodwill went kaput when on the flip side, Qi Fabao, a PLA regiment commander who was involved in the Galwan Clash 2020, was designated to be a torchbearer for the games. In July 2021, when Britain urged their firms to boycott the games under the rationale that China should allow a probe on the human rights violations in the nation, China condemned the “politicisation of sports”, claiming it to be an interference in internal affairs. The duplicitous actions make one wonder whether China viewed the sport different to politics? If so, then one must wonder about the intentions behind the involvement of the PLA commander? The intentions of CCP seem to grow clear when the heavy influence being exerted by the Chinese authorities is viewed through the lens of gaining domestic internal legitimisation and exhibition of the Chinese Communist Party’s power. The games have always been political, but China has reduced it to an arena of power politics that does not cultivate compassion but scatters the seeds of discord and animosity. It is also an illustration of CCP realising its growing power to ridicule any efforts for multi-cooperation without the fear of its repercussions. With China seeking political and monetary benefits from all its initiatives, the games lose their substance.
Would the games of 2022 be an apt specimen of the projection of soft power with Chinese characteristics? While the CCP laid claims to China being democratic, the contradiction of the concept of liberal soft power was evident in the conduct of the games. The underhanded tactics to dismiss unconventional and controversial steps by crass rationales do not pacify the decades of rage created by Chinese actions. It is becoming apparent that soft power ingenuity will not prevent a backlash against its growing military and economic stoutness. CCP neither intends to create goodwill as it prefers fear; therefore, the Beijing Olympics became a balance of might and mockery by CCP, which can’t afford to lose the financial benefit bubble created by the game.
The debate then boils down to whether Olympics are no longer the soft power tradition to reckon with? This statement might not hold much water as the hosts and organising committee still pull in heaps of money, disregarding any political conflicts and clashes. CCP is also occupied in using the game to promote the controversial Xinjiang as a winter paradise and aims to gain through tourism. With players pouring in, the game is evident to bring attention. Still, it might not create long-term demand for its winter wonderland, considering China is sinking in a quicksand of human rights violations and facing international fallout in relations with nations. The 2022 games demonstrate a weak glory simply because Beijing is the setting and Chinese actions defy international norms with its significance diminished to a pawn for advantageous exploitation. A hopeful revival of the spirit and original ideals might be witnessed in the future games, with 2024 being held in France and 2026 in Italy.
(The views expressed are those of the author’s solely and do not represent those of the Centre for Northeast Asian Studies in any way)
Taiwan’s ‘Porcupine strategy’ for cross-strait deterrence explained
Anubhav Shankar Goswami
Research Assistant, Centre for Northeast Asian Studies
Jindal School of International Affairs
O.P Jindal Global University
Email: asgoswami@jgu.edu.in
Author’s bio: Anubhav S Goswami is a Doctoral researcher at Jindal School of International Affairs, O.P Jindal Global University. He holds a Masters in Development Studies from Indian Institute of Technology-Guwahati; and Bachelors in Political Science from University of Delhi. His research interests include Indian Foreign Policy, Indo-US Strategic relationship, U.S Grand Strategy and Sino-American strategic competition.
In an attempt to cow down Taiwan with intimidation, a total of 145 Chinese air force planes flew into Taiwan’s air defence identification zone (ADIZ) between 1 and 3 October.
While its not uncommon for China to regularly and increasingly trespass into Taiwan’s marine and ADIZ, but the latest violation of the latter by a whopping 145 aircraft suggest that Beijing is becoming impatient with the status quo in the Taiwan strait and is looking to adopt a more strident form of coercion and intimidation. Since, violation of its ADIZ has coincided with the Double 10 celebration in Taiwan that begins on 1 October and concludes on her ‘National day’ (10 October), it is strategically prudent to assume that the latest excess is just another attempt by China to intimidate Taiwanese people and leadership from engaging in ‘secessionist’ celebrations.
However, Beijing’s action could also be influenced by the embarrassing turn of events that took place in the distant Baltics. China has found an unlikely adversary in Lithuania. Earlier this year, little Lithuania showed big heart by defying CCP’s warning of punitive actions for Vilnius’ embrace of Taiwan by allowing Taipei to open up a trade representative office with the name ‘Taiwan’ on it. If that was not enough, Lithuania recently asked its officials to dump their Chinese handsets over censorship concerns. China’s power comes from the perception of its power. The David vs Goliath kind of defiance by Lithuania has diminished Beijing in front of the world. A small country disregarding China is a dangerous precedent in the eyes of Beijing, as it can embolden not only international opinion against her but also encourage protests and backlash in her backyard. So, before the world finds its voice on Taiwan, China sent her air force to put her stamp over Taiwan. Beijing is also signalling a warning to the leadership of Taiwan that it must refrain from engaging in any activities that are prejudicial to Chinese interest on their national day.
Be that as it may, China is dead serious on unifying Taiwan with the mainland. It has made its intention all but clear that annexation by force is very much an option on the table. Not only is China driven by nationalist zeal, it is also looking at Taiwan for what it can strategically give Beijing in the long term. Taiwan’s geographic location is of great strategic value in the South China Sea (SCS) which sees a traffic of one-third of global shipping.[1] Thus, Taiwan’s security is very much linked to the idea of protection of sea-lanes of communication (SLOCs) and capitulation of Taiwan will imperil the very objectives of ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’. Beijing knows if it can seize Taiwan, it will be able to establish authority over strategic SLOCs to disrupt commercial shipping intended for her adversaries. In other words, Taipei’s fall will allow China to ‘weaponize’ the strategic value of Taiwan’s geographic location in the SCS.
Therefore, given what its possession could mean for China, future annexation of Taiwan by force is a reality. What then could deter China from a wholesale invasion of Taiwan? Earlier strategy of countering Chinese military strengths in a symmetrical manner with Patriot interceptors, diesel submarines, surface warships, F-16 fighters, and P3 maritime patrol aircraft no longer holds water due to China’s rapid military modernization which has widened the strategic gap between Taipei and Beijing. Since the beginning of its ambitious military modernization a decade ago, China has rapidly introduced precise short-range ballistic missiles, advanced submarines, surface ships, aircraft and surface-to-air missiles which has “fundamentally altered the cross-strait security environment by eroding Taiwan’s strategic depth and geographic advantage.” [2]
To match changed realities, Taiwan has begun redesigning its defence strategy from attempting to destroy PRC’s weapons systems to seeking to deny Beijing its strategic objectives in the Taiwan strait. Factoring the asymmetrical power relation, Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen in her address on the ‘National Day’ of 2020 had said, “We will continue to modernize defensive combat capabilities and accelerate the upgrading of our asymmetrical capabilities to deal with military expansion and provocation from the other side of the Taiwan Strait.”[3] The emphasis on developing the defensive capabilities of Taiwan is part of Taipei’s new strategy of securing the defence of the island through augmentation of its asymmetrical advantage of being the defender.
Popularly known as ‘Porcupine strategy’ and formulated in the writings of William S. Murray, this defensive strategy postulates that “rather than relying on its navy and air force (neither of which is likely to survive such an attack) to destroy an invasion force, Taiwan should concentrate on development of a professional standing army armed with mobile, short-range, defensive weapons.”[4] The rationale behind the deployment of mobile and short-range defensive weapons is that they have a greater chance of surviving an initial Chinese attack and be resilient and lethal for weeks or months.
The latest $3.4 billion package of US arms sales to Taiwan have components which are all asymmetrical assets intended for the fortification of Taiwan in order to render the risks and costs of invasion unacceptable to China.[5] For example, the 100 truck-mounted Harpoon anti-ship missile launchers delivered to Taiwan under the package is meant to thwart the possible landing of China’s fleet of amphibious vessels in Taiwanese beaches. Other components of the package are mines and UAVs. UAVs are bought particularly to locate Chinese amphibious crafts. The package also includes HIMARS multiple rocket launcher system which is a multi-role asset in that it can disrupt the landing of PLA forces on Taiwan’s beaches as well as conduct long-range missile strikes into Chinese mainland.[6]
For Taiwan, these military assets are demonstrably cheaper than its earlier acquisitions which enables Taipei to shore up its defence capabilities without putting a heavy stress on its exchequer. Therefore, these platforms could be bought in bulk to create a series of survivable, low-profile and networked defences that can be readily deployed, dispersed, camouflaged and can pose a threat to Chinese assets that are disproportionately expensive. This will raise the cost of invasion for China. If Taiwan manages to install enough of these ‘spikes’ with its porcupine strategy, then its resilience capacity will increase which consequently will shrink Beijing’s prior confidence in a successful invasion. That will ultimately strengthen cross-strait deterrence.
Correction: China did not breach Taiwanese airspace but its ADIZ. The original article erroneously stated that the airspace was breached.
(The views expressed are those of the author’s solely and do not represent those of the Centre for Northeast Asian Studies in any way)
[1] CSIS. (2017). How much trade transits the South China Sea? China Power Project.
[2] Lin, W. L. L., Cassidy, M., & MURRAY, W. S. (2009). The myth of an isolated scenario. Naval War College Review, 62(2), 129-138.
[3] Gateway House. (2020). Taiwanese porcupine vs Chinese dragon. Gateway House, https://www.gatewayhouse.in/taiwan-china-submarine/
[4] S. Murray, W. (2008). Revisiting Taiwan’s defense strategy. Naval War College Review, 61(3), 12-39.
[5] Kaushal. S. (2020). US weapons sale to Taiwan: Upholding the porcupine strategy. RUSI, https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/us-weapons-sales-taiwan-upholding-porcupine-strategy
[6] Ibid.
Commentary No. 2, 2021
TPNW : Opportunities and Challenges for East Asia
Anushka Saxena
(Anushka Saxena is a student of Diplomacy, Law and Business (Masters) at the Jindal School of International Affairs. She completed her Bachelors in History from Lady Shri Ram College for Women, Delhi University. Her research interests include India’s Diplomatic Engagements, Maritime Geopolitics, Cross-Strait relations and Regional Security.)
On the 22nd of January, 2021, the United Nations Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) entered into force and marked a milestone by calling for a complete ban on yet another class of weapons of mass destruction. The threat of nuclear weapons has plagued the world since the United States, in open violation of the principles of war, dropped two atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan. Seeing as the half-life of Uranium can last as long as 24,000 years, it is safe to say that this was more than an act of war – it was a crime committed against the lives of generations to come. In the context of the death and destruction witnessed at the hands of nuclear weapons, the fact that the UN took the step to finally introduce a ban on nuclear weapons through the TPNW over seven decades after the bombing of Japan, is both commendable, and a symbol of how realpolitik prevented it from happening for so long.
When the UN was formed in the aftermath of World War II, the five nuclear states – the United States, People’s Republic of China, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, and the French Republic – were regarded as the superpowers that needed the high seat on the table of sovereign nations. As a result, they were accorded the status of permanent members in the UN Security Council, a body with a mandate to secure peace and stability in the world. While it was already ironic in the 20th century, in the 21st century, the permanent member-system does not reflect the contemporary realities of the world. Despite the existence of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968 (in force – 1970), the above-mentioned nuclear nations have engaged in vertical proliferation by continuing to technologically enhance their nuclear arsenal, in the development and proliferation of nuclear-armed submarines, and so on. Undoubtedly, said countries have been regular in their cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency and have made significant strides in nuclear disarmament. But as a multipolar world emerges, it is time for them to give up nuclear weapons altogether.
In the context of East Asia, the threat of stockpiling and the use of nuclear weapons is immense. Not only does the region house China (mainland), an NPT-recognised nuclear state, it also houses the notorious North Korea – a nuclear regime with no accountability to the world. Despite having been admitted to the UN in 1991, and despite being the subject of various UNSC resolutions and sanctions, the Democratic People’s Republic (North) Korea has neither been a party to any nuclear non-proliferation regimes, nor has it taken measures to reduce its stockpile. Recently, South Korean military sources have declared that a short-range ballistic missile was fired by Pyongyang, and apparently, it is a jab at American “hostility” towards DPRK. It is indicative of a long trend in US-North Korea relations, wherein nuclear weapons have become a necessity to maintain the facade of deterrence. The concerns are the biggest for the Republic of (South) Korea, primarily because since 1992, which was the first time DPRK and ROK committed to a Joint Declaration to denuclearize the Korean peninsula, the former has made no efforts to achieve the intended goal. On the other hand, while the latter has been promised American nuclear protection in case the need arises, the US is no longer a reliable ally. The most prominent reasons for this are the hostilities between US and China, which has pushed ROK to play a balance game in its cordial relations with both parties, as well as the hasty US withdrawal from the unwinnable war in Afghanistan.
The China factor is equally significant. China is an aggressive nation with a deep-found belief in its ever-expanding military and economic might. Its ‘One-China Policy’ is a cause of cross-strait fluxes, because historical precedents dictate that if mainland China has once projected its might by firing missiles into the Taiwan strait (1995) and bombing ROC’s islands (1954-58), it might do it again. The China-US ping-pong diplomacy over the Taiwan issue continues, and it follows two n’s of deterrence – naval, and of course, nuclear. Just like South Korea, Taiwan is a nuclear ally of the US, with shared concerns. Seeing as mainland China has chosen not to be part of the TPNW while Taiwan has no voice or representation in the UN on the matter, China has the leeway to exploit its nuclear capacities if it takes the militaristic route to attainment of cross-strait reunification.
Hence, for East Asia in specific and world peace in general, TPNW both faces and gives rise to challenges. To begin with, it’s a regime with no legal bind for members of the UN as a whole, which agreeably would be a violation of a nation’s sovereign integrity, as enshrined in Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter. As for now, it only applies to the 56 states that have ratified/ acceded to it, out of the 193 member states of the UN. Arguably, the treaty has brought into force Article VI of the NPT, which called for progress towards negotiations over nuclear disarmament, and eventual achievement of disarmament itself. The TPNW also reaffirms the comprehensive obligations listed under Article III of the NPT, through its own Articles 3 (on Safeguards) and 4 (on obligations towards complete nuclear disarmament). However, its complementarity with the NPT is being questioned by NATO allies on the vague grounds that the provisions of TPNW undermine the larger commitments towards nuclear non-proliferation. However, non-proliferation and disarmament can no longer be considered as silos – the approach has to be juxtaposed, and the inclusion of nuclear weapon states will be most important in that regard. This is because unless such states reduce their stockpile, both armament and proliferation will continue in one way or another.
Historical events like the Three Mile Island, Fukushima and Chernobyl nuclear disasters have demonstrated that even peaceful, civilian uses of nuclear energy can have drastic conclusions due to operator faults and standard fallouts. In this context, a pledge to strengthen commitment towards making peaceful use safer is of the essence, primarily within China and Russia in the East Asian context. At the same time, NATO efforts must be directed towards ratification and North Korean nuclear disarmament. In this light, TPNW has the potential to define a nuclear disarmament strategy for years to come.
(The views expressed are those of the author’s solely and do not represent those of the Centre for Northeast Asian Studies in any way)
South Korea’s Living with COVID-19 Strategy
Aditi Maurya
(Aditi Maurya is a first year Master’s student of Diplomacy, Law and Business at the Jindal School of International Affairs. She holds a Bachelor’s degree in Political Science and History from Jai Hind College, University of Mumbai. Her research interests include Geopolitics, Regional Security and Economic Diplomacy of North-East Asia.)
On 25th October 2021, South Korea unveiled a blueprint for “Living with Covid-19” strategy following similar plans implemented by countries like Singapore and Taiwan.
This is not a shocking development considering South Korea’s policy for COVID-19 since the pandemic’s inception in 2020. South Korea was lauded for its exceptional response as the nation never instituted a complete lockdown and executed proper measures to truncate the waves. Following a similar pattern “Living with Covid-19” is a step towards what constitutes a ‘normal’ life. The policy is based on a belief that a focused ploy to monitor hospitalized critical individuals and deaths would be a better approach to regulate the spread. Suncheon became the first city to adopt the policy and it was further rolled out nationally on November 1st.
In 2020, the country followed a two-pronged strategy equipped with its technology where they strengthened their medical services and timely imposed distancing measures. Relaxing the measures under the strategy has been controversial as the situation defers from 2020 because South Korea is currently witnessing a 4th wave with a comparative higher increase in the number of cases. A dip in economic activity was witnessed on the account of constraints imposed on movement due to the 4th wave. Consumer interest dove with small and medium businesses taking a major hit and gross domestic product fell as private consumption fell by 0.3%. The authorities are not willing to risk commerce again since consumer sentiment returned to the country after three months in October as a result of the relaxations implemented under the new rules neither do they want to endanger the Small and Medium Business.
Three phases have been proposed to aid the return to normalcy, according to the blueprint. In the first phase, ten persons can congregate regardless of vaccination status, but only four unvaccinated people are permitted inside public places like restaurants and cafés. A majority of these enterprises are permitted to operate 24 hours a day, seven days a week, although high-risk establishments like as bars and nightclubs are forced to close at midnight. It’s probable that a control conduct is in place, given that the authorities stress on the “vaccine pass” and continues to enforce that citizens would need to produce their credentials to enter busy locations. The authorities are hopeful that by the second phase they will be able to sanction sizeable events and purge restrictions on all kinds of social gatherings by the third phase bridging into normal life by early 2022.
With a focus shift, vaccination has been prioritized. South Korea started its vaccine campaign later than other nations to study and allow comparable programmes in other countries to play out; but it has been more aggressive and successful than others who started earlier. It is estimated by Reuters that 76.7% of the population has been vaccinated with both the doses and within 27 days 10% more will be vaccinated. Professor Kim Woo Joo, a professor at the Korea University interviewed with the Korea Times explicating that “the country’s vaccination program has gained speed, but efficacy of vaccines for those who received shots in the first half of the year may have been reduced, leading to the recent breakthrough of infections”. If the efficacy is determined to be low, then it is possible that the infections may see a further rise disregarding the per cent of vaccinated citizens reckoning the Delta Variant.
By Monday 1st November the restrictions were lifted, and strategists expect the country will see a steep rise in cases. It will be more challenging to control and have a strong hold on the population due to the festive months coming up ahead. The Halloween weekend experienced delinquency in the citizens as many were found violating masking and social distancing rules. With the ease of movement, citizens are also concerned about the strategy witnessing the daily number of cases reach 2,224 on 6th November. Ahead of schools deciding to hold in-person classes from November 22, the country is also encountering a rise of teenage infections.
During the first three waves, the nation was able to keep control owing to technology of contact tracing, an efficient system of testing and quarantine supported by mobile data and GPS. Timely restrictions on international travel and public gatherings also contributed to the success story. The authorities want to depend more on their capability to trace, detect and quarantining to experiment whether they can return to normalcy and economic activities. With this policy change, there is a need for the services to be fast-tracked with immediate results and effective technology with a minimum room for error. Data on infected individuals, medical records, and location need to be collected timely to facilitate all hospitals accurate information for proper treatment. The expansion of walk-in clinics and drive-through clinics must be pursued more aggressively. Vaccination doses need to be supplemented with COVID-19 Booster shots to increase efficacy and prevent spread of new strains. A special focus will be required in the coming months as sensitive developments may follow as restrictions are relaxed.
Countries which introduced “Living with Covid-19” like Singapore have slid back into the pandemic. Regardless of previous results, South Korea has the technological capability to complement the strategy, but they need to be careful in following the best practices conducted by other countries and make changes in the previous policy blunders. Therefore, a close watch should be kept on South Korea’s strategy and their process of transition in hopes that we can replicate their system if they succeed.
(The views expressed are those of the author’s solely and do not represent those of the Centre for Northeast Asian Studies in any way)
Enabling role of Chinese Nuclear Strategy in the erosion of conventional deterrence between itself and the U.S in the first-island chain
Anubhav Shankar Goswami
Research Assistant, Centre for Northeast Asian Studies
Jindal School of International Affairs
O.P Jindal Global University
Email: asgoswami@jgu.edu.in
LinkedIn: Anubhav Goswami
Twitter: Anubhav Shankar (@Shankar5Anubhav)
Author’s bio: Anubhav S Goswami is a Doctoral researcher at Jindal School of International Affairs, O.P Jindal Global University. He holds a Masters in Development Studies from Indian Institute of Technology-Guwahati; and Bachelors in Political Science from University of Delhi. His research interests include Indian Foreign Policy, Indo-US Strategic relationship, U.S Grand Strategy and Sino-American strategic competition.
The experience of the previous cold war between the United States and the Soviet Union had produced many theories that enabled thinkers to develop perspectives on the dynamics of ‘great power competition’. One of those theories is the applicability and the effectiveness of nuclear weapons as a deterrent tool. Perhaps the most valuable lesson drawn from the Cold war was that great powers armed with nuclear bombs would think twice before undermining the other since the risk of confrontation could quickly escalate into a ‘nuclear holocaust’. This fear of escalation comes from nuclear weapons’ guarantee of ‘mutually assured destruction’ (MAD). And therein lies the effectiveness of nuclear weapons as a deterrent tool. Not only were nuclear bombs acquired to retaliate nuclear attacks by nuclear attacks, but it was also seen to prevent conventional attacks since non-nuclear conflicts could very well escalate into nuclear war.
However, this premise is now increasingly challenged by China’s nuclear strategy. Beijing’s strategic objectives are not global like the U.S or the erstwhile Soviet Union. Currently, its ‘strategic geography’ to the east is limited to the first island chains and second island chains. To achieve her strategic goals there, it is the conventional forces that Beijing relies on for its flexibility and usability in conflict. However, since the United States has a significant presence in this part of the world as well as treaty-bound to defend many other stakeholders in the South China Sea (SCS) and East China Sea (ECS), Beijing requires nukes to deter US intervention in her backyard. China’s nuclear forces, in that sense, are intended to check U.S. nuclear dominance and ‘nuclear blackmailing’ in order to win conventional conflicts at the island chains at lower levels of escalation.
Image source: China Report, 2006
Thus, rather than prevent any conventional conflict by deterrence, China’s nuclear strategy is meant to back its conventional forces in conflict by deterring the United States from intervening in a conflict “that did not directly threaten the United States if there was a risk that the conflict could escalate to the nuclear level”. To make that happen, China is building a nuclear force capable of surviving a nuclear first strike and retaliating with an unacceptable level of damage.
According to Fravel M. Taylor and Evan S. Medeiros (2011), for China, a small number of survivable weapons would be enough to retaliate and impose unacceptable damage on an adversary. The emphasis in the composition of China’s nuclear forces is to increase quality over quantity in an effort to achieve a secure second-strike capability. China’s idea of deterrence, then, is not a question of nuclear equivalency with adversaries, but only the assurance that China could retaliate. Based on their focus on assurance of retaliation and second-strike capability, experts have argued that China’s nuclear strategy is one of “assured retaliation”.
However, ‘assured retaliation’ will only ever be successful, if China’s retaliatory options are credible. Beijing knows its ballistic missiles will be tested by US missile defense systems. Therefore, for some time now it has made a conscious effort to develop Hypersonic glide vehicles to make its retaliatory option more credible. Hypersonic glide vehicles are harder to track and destroy because they fly at lower trajectory and can manoeuvre in flight. Therefore, a hypersonic glide vehicle armed with a nuclear warhead could help China “negate” US missile defence systems. It is due to this reason that the U.S is taking China’s recently alleged testing of a nuclear-capable hypersonic missile in August so seriously. The mission didn’t succeed as intended, but it demonstrated that China now possesses advanced payload capability. If China is able to develop hypersonic missile capabilities fully, it will destabilise the current status quo between the U.S and China. After all, Beijing would then have a credible ‘assured retaliation’ option to deter American intervention and reduce the ceiling on nuclear threshold that will enable her to embark on conventional conflicts in her backyard against American allies.
The United States’ dominance in Asia comes from its ability to sustain the post-World War two alliance architecture. China’s goal is to break that alliance structure by threatening to significantly raise the risk of escalation where it dares United States by waging conventional attacks against her allies. Knowing fully well that Washington will not risk a nuclear fallout with China due to the latter’s ‘assured retaliation’, China bets that this will prompt United States to stay away from the local fights between China and American allies.
With a fully developed ‘assured retaliation’ against USA, China will gain greater confidence to pull super ambitious strategic moves in the Himalayas, SCS, ECS and create conditions for conventional warfare in order to seize strategic objectives vis-a-vis her regional challengers that will make her the undisputed hegemon of Asia. In that sense, it could be inferred from China’s nuclear strategy that MAD is no longer a guarantee of prevention of conventional conflicts if the nuclear threshold is successfully brought down. By deterring US intervention through credible ‘assured retaliation’, Beijing expects to constrain the scope of any war that may erupt.
(The views expressed are those of the author’s solely and do not represent those of the Centre for Northeast Asian Studies in any way)
Transboundary River Management of the Upper Mekong River in China: Effects and Implications of the Series of Dam Constructions in the Upper Mekong Basin
By Narender Kumar
(Narender Kumar is currently a Doctoral student at Jindal School of International Relations at O.P. Jindal Global University. He previously holds a Masters degree in Theological Studies from Mysore University, followed by another Masters in Global Studies from Ambedkar University Delhi. His research interests include international water conflicts, Indo-Bangladesh and China relations, Hydroelectricity projects, Environmental governance, and transnational politics over the common property resources (CPR)
Mekong river originates at the Tibet plateau and flows downward to Southeast Asia, covering over 5000 kilometers before submerging in the South China sea. It is one of the longest rivers globally, flowing through six countries: China, Myanmar, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. The river is one of the richest areas of biodiversity in the world, with over 20,000 plants and 850 fish species. The lower Mekong river has 80% of people estimated to be around 65 million depending on the river resources. Thus, making it the most contested river in the world for sustainable development and agricultural practices. However, in the upper Mekong basin, China has constructed 11 hydroelectric dams with two large storage dams for the storage of freshwater for irrigation and domestic purposes.
Figure 2: Sub-basins, major rivers, and evaluation of the UMB in China
Source: https://www.mrcmekong.org/our-work/topics/hydropower/
Lobsang Yangsto informs that China remains in a water crisis – both in quantity and quality. Large substantial water in urban China is either inappropriate for drinking or unfit for use in agriculture and industry. The disproportionate water resources in northern and southern China have led to the huge demand for water from the southern reservoir where 96% of total freshwater resources lie in comparison to just 13.5% of water resources in the southern part of China with a booming population of 45%. However, China has an advantageous geographical position with 19 transboundary rivers flowing in and out of its sovereign boundaries. Most of the major international rivers such as the Mekong, the Brahmaputra, the Indus, the Yangtze, and the Sutlej river flow from the Tibetan Plateau – a Chinese-occupied territory. The geographical advantage has favored China in dam construction. Although the Ministry of Water Resources of PRC (People’s Republic of China) stated that “it sticks to the principle of putting people first, emphasizing equality, rationality, balancing development and protection and enhancing good-neighboring friendship and cooperation”. However, it is one of the only three countries to sign against the UN convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Use of International Water resources. As a result, China has dammed all the international rivers of the Tibetan Plateau with absolute sovereignty and hegemony – without signing a single international water-sharing agreement with its neighbors.
The extensive construction of Dams in the upper Mekong river could lead to various disruptions in the ecology and biodiversity in the lower Mekong basin, where the river dependency is comparatively large. However, China remains short on freshwater resources and depends on South China or Tibetan plateau river basins for their economic and domestic needs of freshwater. Therefore, the control of the upper Mekong is significantly crucial for Chinese dependency on hydroelectric generation and freshwater needs. Each hydroelectric dam in the Upper Mekong river basin generates about 100 MW of hydroelectric. The total hydroelectric production amounted to 31,605 MW, increasing from 21,310 MW. China generates about US$ 4 billion each year from hydroelectric dams. The construction of these projects has raised serious concerns about the water flow in the dry season and affected the sedimentary budget of the lower basin with various agricultural disruptions, floods, fish migrations, and river-based forests. Richard P Cronin writes that China is set to exploit the full potential of the upper Mekong river resources, while it considers the basin known as Lancang as a national river. Therefore, the Beijing administration not only bothered with the effects of hydroelectric dam construction on the downward neighbor but also forbids to share any information on the hydroelectric development and level of the reservoir with their neighbor as it remains a security secret.
There are a lot of discussions on the construction and management of dams in the upper Mekong River and its impact on the lower basin. Some believe that the construction of dams in the upper Mekong has a direct impact on the lower basin and its ecology as the water level drastically decreases in the dry seasons. While others maintained that the climatic conditions, socio-economic conditions, and population increase in the Lower Mekong basin have a direct effect on the water level and its utilization. However, Shaojuan Li and Daming He in their study on Upper Mekong Basin have argued that “river-flow variation is particularly subject to the influences of climate change and human activities, yet the upper Mekong dams are but one of many drivers of change”. The total water storage of these reservoirs – Manwan and Dachaoshan dams are thirty times smaller than the total water flows out of China each year. Furthermore, these dams are not used for industrial and irrigation purposes but only for the production of hydroelectricity. However, it is undeniable that these dams have no effects on ecological and biodiversity in the lower basin and its population. Moreover, the Chinese non-cooperative and hegemony raises serious concerns among the lower riparian states who are heavily dependent on the river for energy supplies, fishing, and irrigation industries.
Bibliography
Yangtso, Lobsang. “China’s River Politics on the Tibetan Plateau: Comparative Study of Brahmaputra and Mekong.” The Tibet Journal 42, no. 2 (2017): 49–58.
Cronin, Richard P. “Hydropower Dams on the Mekong: Old Dreams, New Dangers.” Asia Policy, no. 16 (2013): 32–38.
Li, Shaojuan, and Daming He. “Water Level Response to Hydropower Development in the Upper Mekong River.” Ambio 37, no. 3 (2008): 170–77.
https://www.mrcmekong.org/about/mekong-basin/
(The views expressed are those of the author’s solely and do not represent those of the Centre for Northeast Asian Studies in any way)
India’s Role in the Russian Far East and Northeast Asia’s Energy Security
–Divyanshu Jindal, Research Assistant, Centre for Northeast Asian Studies
In September this year, while addressing the Eastern Economic Forum virtually, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi expressed optimism that India and Russia together can bring stability in global energy market. Investments and close cooperation in the RFE are expected to be a major part of this optimism. Indian government has emphasised on coordination with Japan and South Korea for developing infrastructure and bringing investments to help in realising the full potential of energy capacities in the Russian Far East.
Russia holds world’s largest known reserves of natural gas. A majority of these reserves are present in Russia’s Far East region (RFE). This region is geographically connected with the Asia Pacific region. The RFE comprises of the Far Eastern Federal district- the easternmost territory of Russia sandwiched between eastern Siberia and the Pacific Ocean. It shares land borders with Mongolia, China and North Korea, and maritime borders with Japan to the southeast and with the US to its northeast, with South Korea in close vicinity. For all practical purposes, Russian Far East is an integral part of Northeast Asia. However, the region needs large-scale infrastructural development and investment for realising its energy potential.
Since 2006, the Russian government has made efforts to induce robust state-private cooperation in the RFE. Moscow has for long expressed the urgent need to pull foreign investments as a way to create and sustain the energy infrastructure which can secure both- Russian interests and the needs of the regional as well as European energy importers. This development has often been seen in light of Russia’s aim to project itself as a greater Asian power and regain its status as a leading global power. But Moscow’s inability to create necessary viable policy related conditions for investors and the desired basic infrastructural facilities in the region still concerns the prospective investors.
Russia’s Aspirations for the RFE
Russia’s concern and interest in developing the RFE has been longstanding. In 2002, Vladmir Popatov, the Deputy Secretary of the Russian Security Council had highlighted that RFE’s development is of utmost concern as the region is not only rich in diverse resources and massive energy resources and stands in geographical proximity to densely populated nations with massive energy needs, but it also runs the risk of depopulation, security risks and stagnation of internal communication systems in absence of development. The concern was reiterated in 2006 by President Vladimir Putin who warned that the socio-economic isolation of the RFE threatens Russia’s national security. In 2008, the then President Dmitry Medvedev had expressed concern that if Russia fails to develop the RFE, it could turn into a raw material base for more developed Asian countries and a neo-colonial pattern of energy trade can emerge. Despite several government programs and funding commitments the region did not witness considerable development and investor interest for long.
Russia’s 2035 Energy Strategy is geared at transitioning Russia towards resource-innovation. To do this, Russia wants to reorient its own as well as the regional energy demand and consumption, reduce isolation from the regional economies, and link the RFE and the Arctic to the Northeast Asian markets, which can be further integrated in the upcoming projects like the Northern Sea Route (providing a much shorter and faster connectivity with the European markets). Russia hopes to increase its LNG exports to rise from 6 to 30 percent by 2035, and also become the top player in the Hydrogen fuel energy. A major portion of this increase in export is expected to come out of the Northeast Asian region.
Chinese Dominance in the RFE
Since 2008, in the aftermath of the Global Financial crisis and Russia’s conflicts in the post-Soviet region, China has heavily invested in Russian energy sector. China proposed the ‘Loans for Oil’ program with Russia which the government agreed despite reservations and opened up the RFE for Chinese interests. Russia’s engagement with China increased more with its conflicts with Ukraine in 2014 and the resulting tilt away from the western investments and western markets. China has been the leading source of foreign direct investment as well as the leading exporter of finished goods in the region, especially in the districts closer to the Russia-China border. But even though Russia has supplied more than 10 percent of China’s crude oil needs through pipelines from Eastern Siberian region, China has looked to diversify its energy exports basket by investing in projects in Central Asia and Middle East. Besides the scepticisms in Russian political circles related to Chinese increasing domination in the RFE, this factor has also led to a slowdown in Chinese investments in the RFE, forcing Moscow to look towards Seoul, New Delhi, and Tokyo. China has not been a major importer of LNG from Russia, however a greater synergy between Russia, South Korea and Japan can decrease Russia’s dependence on China for financial stability, which is bound to worry Beijing, given how China-Russia relations have been overwhelmingly asymmetrical in terms of their trade baskets.
Can India lead the way?
Japan and Russia have long expressed ‘strong hopes’ of engaging to resolve the Kurile islands dispute that has existed since the conclusion of the second World War. Any meaningful changes still elude the talks and political engagements that have taken place over the decades. It has been highlighted regularly that this issue has restricted the potential for Russo-Japanese collaboration in almost all spheres.
The Joint statement of the 10th Japan-India Energy Dialogue highlighted that India and Japan have been collaborating to develop several oil and gas projects in third countries beyond Russia- like UAE, Canada, Mozambique, and Sri Lanka. Both India and Japan stand to gain from developing LNG markets and associated emerging cleaner technologies like Hydrogen and Fuel cells. As Russia is expected to become a leading producer of Hydrogen fuel in coming years, India and Japan can benefit from close cooperation in the RFE. This trilateral cooperation will also provide a sort of strategic balance in the regional geopolitics where China’s rise has been unrestricted in the last two decades.
The first Trilateral Track II dialogue on India-Japan-Trilateral cooperation in the RFE was held in January this year. It noted the complementarities of capacities and convergence of interests among the three nations along with the inter-connected nature of regional development in the RFE.
Republic of Korea (South Korea) stands as one of the top economies in the world today. The nation has a diversified energy supply mix, and along with a strong nuclear industry it has become a pioneer in the LNG trade. South Korea relies heavily on oil imports from Middle East, but it has done well in terms of diversifying its imports of fossil fuels from Southeast Asia and Australia. With almost completely privatized oil and gas industry, South Korea has participated in a long list of oil and gas development projects, spanning across Southeast Asia, Gulf of Mexico, and Canada.
For long, Russia has seen it engagement with South Korea from the perspective of South Korea’s relations with the US and the North Korea-South Korea reconcilliation and Korean peninsula’s de-nuclearization. Way back in 2007, the ‘Six-party agreement’ took shape which would create the conditions needed to implement ‘a series of multilateral projects with the participation of both North Korea and Russia- including oil gas transit, electricity transfers, and the several other connectivity projects’. However, the collapse of this process resulted in diminished hopes of securing a Russia-led regional integration in Northeast Asia for energy infrastructure. While North Korea is today reeling under severe international sanctions due to its arms testing and projects to become a nuclear power, Russia has looked towards closer cooperation with South Korea in terms of investments and energy trade through the RFE region. South Korea’s ‘New Northern Policy’ places particular importance on Russia. With Russia not worried about South Korea establishing itself in the RFE (as has been stated constantly in case of China), Russo-Korean partnership can have a brighter future.
Seoul too has recently shown interest in re-engaging in implementation of trilateral cooperation projects in the Russia-South Korea-North Korea format, which includes Trans-Korea railroad and the Trans-Korea gas pipeline. India’s presence in the process can provide a robust framework for the optimal capacity creation and utilisation of the RFE.
Conclusion
With the weight of the global economy shifting eastward, Indo-pacific region is rising in importance exponentially. This has also increased the possibilities in adjacent areas like the Arctic, and the Northeast Asia. With Moscow’s emphasis on developing the Russian Far East to utilize the region on various fronts in coming years, it is an opportunity for India to step in and achieve multiple targets. By aiming well, India can not only establish a presence in the region and challenge China’s unquestioned dominance, but India can also utilise this as a way to collaborate with the likes of Japan and South Korea, which are two very vital economies in the Indo-Pacific region and want better terms with Russia and India as well. India can lead a new framework which can aim at providing global energy market stability through coordinating efforts in the RFE.
(The views expressed are those of the author’s solely and do not represent those of the Centre for Northeast Asian Studies in any way)
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By Shagun Thapliyal - Central Bank Digital Currencies and their Impact in China
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By Bhavya ShejpalGenocide In China’s Xinjiang
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Written by: B.S. Ashish (Jindal School of International Affairs)
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Korea Fair in India – Delhi 2021
By Palak Maheshwari
(Palak Maheshwari is currently a postgraduate student of International Relations at the Jindal School of International Affairs. She has research interests in public diplomacy, soft power, East Asia, the Indian Ocean region, film and other visual cultures.)
The Korea Fair in India, which was held in the Select City Walk Mall in Delhi, was a one-of its kind B2C and B2B fair showcasing Korean products. Various Korean agencies were involved in its execution. Besides the Embassy of the Republic of Korea, the Korean Cultural Centre (KCC), Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA), the Presidential Committee on the New Southern Policy and the Korea Tourism Organization (KTO) were also involved. India’s CIPAM which falls under the Ministry of Trade and Commerce was also one of the collaborators.
The various installations at the fair displayed everything from Korean beauty products to electronics. K-Beauty website BeautyTalk’s stall was particularly well-stocked and one of the most crowded ones. K-beauty staples like sheet masks, face tonics, makeup tools etc. were all displayed.
Popular online store Korikart, which sells all things Korean in India and popular Korean art store Hobby Craft also had stalls.
Food stalls selling tteokbokki, seaweed soup and banana/strawberry milk could also be seen. Many visitors I spoke to said that they were curious to try these things because characters in their favourite dramas were often seen consuming them.
The marketers perhaps knew of the impact of the Korean popular-culture wave (or Hallyu) as they advertised their products and associated them with dramas. A particular store selling ginseng tried to make it familiar to shoppers by invoking images of Song Joong-ki and Jung Hae-in consuming it in Descendants of the Sun and Something in the Rain respectively.
The biggest eyeballs, by far, were accorded to South Korean giants BTS. The sensational boyband could be seen on coffee mugs, photo booths and gift hampers. BTS motifs could also be seen on the clothes and accessories many visitors wore to the fair. A lot of people also drew/wrote BTS-related musings on the electronic writing boards setup by the fair.
Many lucky-draw contests, photo-booths and small quizzes were organized for the visitors. One of these can be seen in the picture below. The picture plastered in the back of this photo-booth is from the 2020 hit K-Drama The King: Eternal Monarch starring popular actor Lee Min-ho.
In the weeks leading up to the event, many online events were organized by KTO and KCC to create buzz for the fair. These were all clubbed under the #KXperience hashtag on social media. Contests revolving around K-Pop, K-Food, K-Beauty and K-Drama were organized.
The Korea Fair in India seemed like the organic manifestation of the Korean Wave that has swept India during the pandemic years of 2020 and 2021. What is not popularly known is that Korean products have been distributed and consumed in India for over a decade – the pandemic just made them come to the forefront. In my conversations with the visitors (mostly young women), I found that many of them had been following Korean pop-culture for a while and had especially travelled to the mall to visit the fair. Many had become interested in South Korea as a country after being exposed to the culture, and all of them expressed a desire to visit South Korea whenever the pandemic subsides and their circumstances allow. For Indian fans of Hallyu, the Korea Fair provided them with an avenue to express their deep interest in Korean culture and find like-minded people.
For the Koreans, the fair provided an excellent opportunity for public diplomacy and provided an avenue for Korean businesses to find a bigger customer base.
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All text and pictures by Palak Maheshwari
(The views expressed are of the author’s solely and do not reflect that of the Centre’s)
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Assistant Professor, Director, Centre for Northeast Asian Studies
Dr Manoj Kumar Panigrahi is an Assistant Professor and Director, of the Centre for Northeast Asian Studies at the Jindal School of International Affairs. Dr Panigrahi holds a bachelor’s in political science from Berhampur University, Master’s degree in Diplomacy, Law, and Business from O.P. Jindal Global University (India). He was a recipient of Taiwan’s Ministry of Education Scholarship to pursue doctoral studies. He completed his PhD at National Chengchi University (Taiwan). He was a Research Fellow and currently serves as a Non-resident Fellow at Taiwan NextGen Foundation, Taipei.
His research interests include ethnic conflicts, foreign policy, and the culture of Indo-Pacific countries. His PhD dissertation examined the role of mediators in separatist movements in a comparative context. His research also focused on exploring the causation behind the formation of factions in armed ethnic groups and how they impact the peacemaking process.
Dr Panigrahi regularly writes for several of Taiwan’s print media. He contributes to a bilingual blog column where he writes and promotes Indian culture in Taiwan.
He has been invited to more than 101 schools and universities across Taiwan, amounting to more than 300 lectures so far. He has received the Best Scholarship Recipient Student award from Taiwan’s Ministry of Education Scholarship (2016-2020) for his work on sharing Indian culture at the grassroots level in Taiwan.
He offers courses on Conflict Management, Cross-Strait Relations, East Asian Politics and, Taiwanese History, Culture and Politics.
Our Founder: Dr. Sriparna Pathak is an Associate Professor in the Jindal School of International Affairs of O.P. Jindal Global University, Haryana, India. She teaches courses on Foreign Policy of China as well as Theories of International Relations. Her previous work experience covers Universities like Gauhati University, Don Bosco University; the Ministry of External Affairs, where she worked as a Consultant for the Policy Planning and Research Division, working on China’s domestic and foreign polices; think tanks like Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi and Kolkata respectively, South Asia Democratic Forum in Brussels where she is a Research Fellow and the Centre for Armed Forces Historical Research in New Delhi where she worked as a researcher. She has also worked for UNICEF, Madhya Pradesh, researching on governmental educational and medical interventions and impacts on communities.
Awarded a Doctorate degree from the Centre for East Asian Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU) in 2015, Dr. Pathak is fluent in English, Mandarin and Indian languages like Hindi, Bengali and Assamese.
She has been a recipient of the joint fellowship awarded by the Ministry of Human Resources Development, India and the China Scholarship Council, Government of the People’s Republic of China, and she spent two years in China, actively researching various aspects of China’s domestic economy. Her areas of interest are China’s domestic economy, trade and economic relations between India and China and China’s foreign policy and economic linkages with the world.
Dr. Pathak has written more than a dozen chapters in various books on China, the publishers of which include Routlege, Sage and Pentagon among others. Her journal publications include Journal of Contemporary Chinese Political Economy and Strategic Relations, National Sun-Yat Sen University, Taiwan to Journal of Indo Pacific Perspectives of Air University of the U.S. Air Force. She has also been a guest speaker at several think tanks in India and abroad and has been interviewed by media organisations ranging from Sankei Shimbun to Huffington Post to South China Morning Post to The Star, Toronto to Associated Press, Beijing among others. She has also been part of several panels and talk shows in India and in the PRC respectively.
She is currently working on a project on India’s Act East Policy and China’s responses. She is also conducting various types of research on insurgency and China’s support to it in Northeast India. She has been a resource person for various media organisations, colleges, Universities and think tanks within India and abroad. Dr. Pathak firmly believes in the necessity for using specialised knowledge, relying on primary sources on countries of Northeast Asia for strengthening India’s international relations.
Director: Dr. Manoj Kumar Panigrahi
Dr. Manoj Kumar Panigrahi is an Assistant Professor at the Jindal School of International Affairs. Dr. Panigrahi holds a Bachelors in Political Science from Berhampur University, Master’s degree in Diplomacy, Law, and Business from O.P. Jindal Global University (India). He was a recipient of Taiwan’s Ministry of Education Scholarship to pursue doctoral studies. He completed his Ph.D. from National Chengchi University (Taiwan). He was a Research Fellow at Taiwan NextGen Foundation based in Taipei, Taiwan.
His research interests include ethnic conflicts, foreign policy, and the culture of Indo-Pacific countries. His Ph.D. dissertation examined the role of mediators in separatist movements in a comparative context. His research also focused on exploring the causation behind the formation of factions in armed ethnic groups and how they impact the peacemaking process.
Dr. Panigrahi regularly writes for several of Taiwan’s print media. He contributes to a bilingual blog column where he writes and promotes Indian culture in Taiwan.
He has received the Best Scholarship Recipient Student award from Taiwan’s Ministry of Education Scholarship (2016-2020) for his work on sharing Indian culture at the grassroots level in Taiwan. He has been invited to more than 100 schools and universities across Taiwan, amounting to more than 150 lectures so far.
Centre Coordinator Palak Maheshwari, MADLB 2020
Palak Maheshwari is a postgraduate student of International Relations at the Jindal School of International Affairs. Her research interests include soft power, public diplomacy, new media and popular culture. She has written on issues related to the Korean peninsula, Japanese cultural legacy and South Korean soft power in India.
Centre for Northeast Asian Studies Webinar Report on ‘The post-Covid 19 world order and Northeast Asia’ 12 November 2021
Report
Anubhav Shankar Goswami
Research Assistant, Centre for Northeast Asian Studies
Jindal School of International Affairs
O.P Jindal Global University
Email: asgoswami@jgu.edu.in
Divyanshu Jindal
Research Assistant, Centre for Northeast Asian Studies
Jindal School of International Affairs
O.P Jindal Global University
Email: djindal@jgu.edu.in
Centre for Northeast Asian Studies, a dedicated platform by Jindal School of International Affairs (JSIA) for research on Northeast Asia, organized its inaugural webinar – The post-Covid 19 world order and Northeast Asia – on 12 November 2021.
The event started with the opening remarks delivered by Professor and Dean of JSIA, Dr. Sreeram Chaulia. He extended a warm welcome to all the participating eminent scholars – Ambassador Vishnu Prakash, Ex Envoy / Ambassador to Canada & South Korea Foreign Office Spokesman, Prof. Purnendra Jain, Emeritus Professor, Department of Asian Studies. The University of Adelaide, Prof. Yee-Kuang Heng, Graduate School of Public Policy, The University of Tokyo, Ayae Yashimoto, Researcher, Formerly at National Chengchi University, Dr. Young Chul Cho, Associate Professor, School of International Studies, Jeonbuk National University, Ikue Kawauchi, Researcher and Consultant Bangera’s Global Consulting Inc. Tokyo, Prof. Mumin Chen and Naina Singh, Professor, National Chung Hsing University of Taiwan/Doctoral Candidate, National Chung Hsing University of Taiwan, Dr. Raymond Lau, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science and Sociology, North South University (NSU) and Dr.Fang Tien-tze, Associate Professor, National Tsing Hua University.
The webinar began with a keynote speech by Ambassador Prakash who spoke about the persistent lack of American resolve in challenging Chinese belligerence from trade to geopolitics. When asked about possible American commitment of defending Taiwan from Chinese forceful unification, Ambassador Prakash opined that such an assurance looks bleak due to poor political and military resolve of the U.S in calling out China’s aggressions in recent years.
The keynote speech was followed by the first session on Japanese and South Korean views on post-Covid world order. The session was moderated by Dr. Jabin Jacob.
The first speaker of the session Prof. Purnendu Jain argued that in a post-covid world, Japan’s ability to juggle between engaging China economically to balancing China by way of security cooperation with the U.S will be increasingly difficult. Prof. Jain said that China’s numerous punitive actions against Japan like the ‘weaponisation’ of supply chain to hurt Japanese economy has forced Tokyo to pursue a tighter embrace of U.S both economically and militarily. On the question of economic security that has gained renewed focus due to supply chain disruption by Covid-19, Ayae Yashimoto talked about how Japan is trying to enhance its economic security deterrence by making other countries recognize that Japan is economically “indispensable.” Yoshimoto said that by expanding Japan’s presence in the global supply chain, Tokyo intends to achieve indispensability. On the other hand, Prof. Yee-Kuang Heng talked about how Japan is deepening its ties with Britain to diversify its defense and economic ties keeping in mind the unfolding uncertainty of the post-covid world that requires greater flexibility in foreign policy. He highlighted some of the recent key events in their bilateral relations like an agreement between the two nations to comments formal negotiations on Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) to deepen the defence relationship. The session also shifted to a discussion on India-Japan relations. Ikue Kawauchi, an experienced operator of India-Japan relations, pointed how Japanese companies can leverage an India on the cusp of economic leapfrogging to achieve economies of scale.
Putting his country’s view on the emerging post-covid world order, Dr. Young Chul Cho of South Korea said that young South Koreans want continuity of the liberal international world order. Talking more on the matter, Dr Cho said that this commitment to liberal values put young South Korean at odds with illiberal impulses of Beijing. Therefore, South Korean youths have strong anti-Beijing views and feels China’s rise is a threat to liberal values. The session concluded with a brief discussion on the raised points by the panelists and a short Q&A session.
The second session revolved around the perspectives from Taiwan and Hong Kong. The session was chaired and moderated by Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli. The panel for the session consisted of Prof Mumin Chen, Ms. Naina Singh, Dr. Raymond Lau, and Dr. Fang Tien-tze.
Prof Kondapalli started the session by thanking Prof. Pathak and the Centre for Northeast Asian Studies. He highlighted the statistics regarding the COVID-19 infections in Northeast Asian states, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and India. Prof Chen focused on the Taiwanese situation pertaining to the pandemic. He explained how lack of international support and absence of WHO membership has affected Taiwan’s response to the pandemic, despite being the first one to discover and inform about the COVID-19. Ms. Naina raised the point of ‘health’ becoming a part of political discourse in Taiwan to understand why Taiwan reacted to the pandemic the way it did. She emphasized on the point that Taiwan has taken important cues from the SARS pandemic to formulate policy and strategy responses to the COVID-19 pandemic. Dr. Lau discussed the showdown between the Chinese BRI (Belt and Road Initiative) and the Indo-Pacific in the post COVID-19 world order. He highlighted that China’s foreign policy is driven by Beijing’s desire to demonstrate its self-confidence and belief that China can offer a model of economic development as an alternative to western model for the world. He further opined that the current Chinese premier Xi Jinping has led to a radical departure of the three-decade logic of ‘keeping a low profile’ under former leader Deng Xiaoping. Today, the core concept is ‘national rejuvenation’. The next panelist- Dr. Fang, outlined the Chinese Foreign Policy, policy under Xi Jinping, and implications for Indo-Pacific. He explained the various factors which construct the Chinese foreign policy, and the legacy of Deng Xiaoping’s thought. He raised the topics of Xi’s Chinese Dream, Xi Jinping’s Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics of a New Era, the advent of the ‘Chinese Century’, and the Chinese perception of the world. He also highlighted ‘ping shi’ diplomacy- The world view from an equal footing. He argued how despite commitments to the peaceful development, China has not shown considerable actions toward peaceful resolution to territorial disputes. China’s wolf warrior diplomacy was also discussed by multiple panelists, which led to the conclusion of how China has failed to build a benign image of China’s contribution to the world through propaganda.
The session concluded with Dr. Pathak summarizing the key points raised throughout the event by the panelists and what India can learn from the experiences of Northeast Asia for the post-COVID-19 world order. The roundtable event concluded with Dr. Panigrahi delivering the vote of thanks to all the panelists, scholars, and attendees.
Director: Dr. Sriparna Pathak, Associate Professor, Jindal School of International Affairs
EMAIL: spathak@jgu.edu.in
Phone Number: +91 9051964100
Twitter: @Sriparnapathak
Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/sriparnapathak
Director: Dr. Manoj Kumar Panigrahi, Assistant Professor, Jindal School of International Affairs
EMAIL: mkpanigrahi@jgu.edu.in
Phone Number: +91 7419748976
Twitter: @manojkupani
Palak Maheshwari— 20jsia-palak@jgu.edu.in