Centre for Intelligence Research and Analyses

The CIRA will strive to emerge as the country’s centre of excellence for intelligence studies.

• Promote scholarship in the field of intelligence studies.
• Publish regular articles, policy briefs, reports and future scenarios on global geopolitical/ geostrategic risks and emerging challenges.
• Maintain an open-access database of incidents of political violence and conflicts in the Indo-Pacific region.
• Provide fresh, new perspectives to the subject with the aid of ou

The Centre engages in a range of activities, such as research, publication, organizing talks and panel discussions. The Centre aims to collaborate with the risk consulting industry and the satellite imagery providers to keep abreast with emerging technologies and explore opportunities for training and research. The Centre also engages with other research and educational institutions in the field of intelligence studies globally

The Centre offers courses on intelligence research tools and techniques to undergraduate and graduate students.

Exploration in the Arctic: A New Theatre for Geo-politics

As the world struggles to reach a consensus on climate change, several nations are discreetly preparing for a new round of geo-politics in the Arctic. While discussions continue unabated at several forums on issues such as the efficacy of the Paris Climate Accords, the Arctic Circle has been losing sea ice cover at a steady pace and is a primary cause of concern for the entire world. However, the melting ice seems to have unveiled fresh ‘open seas’ once again – and initiated the race to dominate the Arctic.

There are several factors to the geo-politics of the Arctic. First amongst them is shipping – put simply, the Arctic Circle allows ships to reduce travel time drastically while travelling to northern European regions. While this is important to many nations due to lesser costs and its potential in reducing the overreliance on traditional shipping routes (ex: Strait of Malacca, Suez Canal), it is particularly important for China.

China’s outlook for the Arctic’s shipping routes is not only economical due to smaller transit times – it is also strategic. For a nation that relies primarily on exports to sustain its ever-growing economy, China can currently be held hostage at the Strait of Malacca, a narrow passageway between the Malay peninsula and Indonesia, which can be blockaded by South East Asian nations (and/or India), which is a problem referred to by former Chinese President Hu Jintao as the “Malacca Dilemma”. This problem isn’t just a pessimistic outlook from China; the country is frequently involved in territorial disputes with several South East Asian nations in the area of the South China Sea and seeks a shipping route that strategically allows it to continue trade and exports in the event of a blockade. Therefore, strategy is the second important factor in the evolving theatre of the Arctic.

Interestingly, a strategic shipping route for China involves cooperation with the largest Arctic state – Russia. As it stands, the Arctic shipping routes are available due to the summer melting of ice; the route which opens up in this time, known as the Northern Sea Route, passes through Russian EEZ (Exclusive Economic Zone) and as such functions as a toll-road for ships. In due time, climate change will lead to lesser and lesser summer ice, and China hopes to use international waters instead, by going straight through the North Pole (known as the Transpolar Sea Route) and bypassing Russia’s Northern Sea Route. However, this situation is estimated to roughly be two decades away given the current rates of global warming. Thus, China is forced into an uneasy alliance driven by shared economic interests.

The third factor is economical, and is most important for Russia (amongst other Arctic states). Russia has acutely identified business in the Arctic as a goldmine of future revenue, as well as the opportunity of reclaiming the status of a global economic superpower. Post 2014, Russia has suffered economic decline, fall of currency, and insufficient funding for growth, due to various sanctions imposed on it by U.S and NATO countries, owing to the annexation of Crimea by Russia from Ukraine. These sanctions have crippled Western funding for energy projects in the Arctic which were supporting Russia in increasing its export of gas and oil. As a consequence, Russia has welcomed Chinese investment in the Arctic region and is keen on this funding for its mega energy projects such as the Yamal LNG Project. The export of Russian gas and oil to China is also beneficial to the latter, which is currently attempting to diversify its energy imports. Currently, China imports most of its crude oil from Middle Eastern countries (close to 44%) where Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Oman provide the most, while Latin American countries such as Brazil, Colombia and Venezuela constitute the lower end of the imports list. It is interesting to note that these imports are cheaper for China than traditional sources.

It is reasonable to question – why is the Sino-Russian cooperation in the Arctic a ‘marriage of convenience’? The answer may lie in the trademark aggression of the Chinese. Combining all conflicts, China is currently involved in territorial disputes with close to 17 countries/nations – a sign that China has different understandings of ‘sovereignty’ and is aggressively expansionist in nature. In light of this, Russia is extremely cautious of Chinese involvement in the Arctic and may also view Chinese engagement with the Arctic Council as a means of getting their foot through the door. An example illustrating such Russian apprehensions, is of the process of China’s induction into the Arctic Council in 2013 as an Observer State, where Russia had staunchly opposed Chinese involvement in the Arctic and agreed to the latter’s induction only when China formally accepted the sovereignty of Arctic states. Additionally, in an effort to balance Chinese engagement, Russia also supported the addition of Japan and South Korea to the Arctic Council. As a result of these concerns, Russia has limited the percentage of Chinese stakes in the Yamal LNG Project. , a mega energy project in the Yamal Peninsula’s Sabetta region. Together with Arctic LNG 2, the project is crucial to Russia as it contains close to 690 billion cubic meters of natural gas reserves, and pumps nearly 17 million metric tons per annum of LNG into the market. As of 2020, Yamal LNG accounted for more than 5% of the global LNG market.

The apprehensions are not of Russia alone – China too fears that its investments will increase Russian capability and allow it to play a greater role in policing the Arctic. Hence, agreements between the two nations are meticulous and take time to materialize.

While this friction has not resulted in complete cooperation, it hasn’t resulted in animosity either. China currently acknowledges Russian sovereignty and complies with regulations that require all ships to be accompanied by a Russian icebreaker ship. The two countries also share details on scientific experiments in the Arctic and take a common stand against perceived militarization by the U.S and NATO, and a unipolar world order in general. On ground cooperation does have a few thorns such as the arrest of an Arctic expert by Russia on the basis of selling state secrets; such incidents are not highlighted due to the realpolitik nature of the alliance.

These developments have not gone unnoticed in the power centres of the world. The fourth factor, in this sense, is international affairs – a melting Arctic has led to an increase in the involvement of U.S, Canada, NATO, and other Arctic states. The U.S and NATO primarily fear the militarization of the Arctic and control of international waters, and a result have stepped up military exercises in the region. The U.S has increased its presence in the Arctic by developing joint bases, such as 3 new facilities in bases in Norway, which it will operate as ports for economic and strategic benefit. Similarly, Russia has revived several Soviet bases along its Arctic coastline while accusing the West of militarizing the Arctic. Additionally, nations are stepping up funding for the infrastructure required for operating in the Arctic, such as icebreaker ships; the U.S currently only has two icebreakers while Russia operates close to 40, of which 4 are nuclear powered, and more are in production.

Interestingly, India, a non-Arctic state with Observer status like China, is reportedly in the process of finalising the RELOS agreement with Russia which would grant it access to Russian military bases in the Arctic. Additionally, India has used claims of scientific research and the impact of climate change on the monsoon season to position itself as a stakeholder in Arctic decision-making, as is displayed in its draft Arctic policy released in early 2021.

Countries active in the Arctic	Number of Icebreakers (Complete Fleet)
Russia	40
Canada	18
Finland	9
Sweden	5
China	2
U.S	1
India	0

 

From the viewpoint of the international community, China’s involvement in the Arctic is not warranted. This point has been raised by several nations in the Arctic Council but most vehemently by the U.S, in response to China’s Arctic Strategy unveiled in 2018. In this strategy, China proclaimed itself as a “near-Arctic state” on the basis of historical claims and proximity to `the impact of climate change originating from the Arctic. This self-definition has raised red-flags over Chinese ambitions in the area, with even Russia refusing to agree on the definition.

With this endeavour, China attempts to include itself in the governance of the Arctic and advocate for a free-navigation policy, as a means to develop its “Polar Silk Route” a sub-project under its grander world-linking economic project known as the Belt and Road Initiative.

The future of the Arctic may be bleak for environmentalists, but nations have spared no time in adapting to the new possibilities and charting out their role in the North Pole. Whether this region evolves a region of cooperation or animosity remains to be seen.

Deepankar Patil

M.A (DLB) 2021

The Concerning Rising Piracy in West Africa

The shipping industry is the backbone of the global economy. Accounting for an overwhelming majority of international trade, it is one of the most important transportation sectors. This sophisticated system has been challenged by a multitude of concerns, the most prominent among which is ‘Piracy’. The threat of piracy makes key trading routes (notably the Suez Canal, Gulf of Guinea, Gulf Aden, among others) vulnerable.

Somalia is notoriously famous for piracy (and related activities), in areas around the Gulf of Aden, Guardafui Channel and Somali Sea. Somalia was plagued by instability since the beginning of the civil war in 1999, making surveillance and patrolling within its territorial waters difficult, and a far less priority. With a loose control over Somali territorial jurisdiction came illegal international fishing vessels that eventually depleted Somali reserves. This caused havoc among the local Somali fishing communities, who decided to establish armed groups to prevent illegal fishing. Therefore Piracy in Somalia originally targeted small scale fishing vessels, gradually evolving to challenge large scale international containerships. Despite gaining momentum, these efforts by armed militias were thwarted with the adoption of UNSC Resolution 1816, which for the first time since the Council’s formation, brought all P5 members together with no opposition. This was followed by an international coalition called the ‘Combined Task Force 150’, tasked with pursuing ‘Operation Ocean Shield’ in the region, enabling significant use of force. The operation (which lasted from 17th August 2009 – 24th November 2016), decimated Somali piracy operations and reduced such incidents in the Horn of Africa by 80%.

There has been an uptick in piracy incidents off the coast of West Africa. The region overtook the Horn of Africa in the number of incidents involving piracy as far back as 2012. Although Piracy off the Horn of Africa is in decline, it is widespread in West Africa. These attacks generally take place in Nigeria’s Niger Delta region, off Benin, Côte D’ivoire, Ghana, Guinea and Togo. Interestingly, the motives of West African pirates are different. Unlike Somali pirates that only hijack vessels and kidnap crew for ransom, they also mean to steal goods (particularly oil). Locals in West Africa, see large corporations and ‘Big Oil’, as entities entrenched in exploitation of their resources.  Paradoxically, the large amounts of offshore hydrocarbons has created poverty rather than wealth. It has imploded social tensions and increased environmental pollution. Only the central government, oil companies, and local elites have benefitted from oil production. Those excluded from the benefits have turned to organised crime in the form of ‘petro piracy’. This form of piracy is aimed at stealing crude-oil from tankers and pipelines so as to process the gains in illegally set up refineries. Hence there is a belief that what is rightfully theirs is being taken away from them. We can observe a similarity in piracy off the Horn of Africa and West Africa. Both established armed groups with a sentiment of vengefulness against ‘invaders’ who seeked to exploit their resources.

As is often the case, corruption in these regions causes a weak enforcement of law and order. This, accompanied by an unregulated oil market, makes it easy for criminal enterprises to move stolen and refined products to legitimate markets. In the Nigerian Niger Delta, geography makes it easy for pirates to move stolen commodities in the thousands of streams, mangroves and rivers. According to sources, there is hardly any week that goes by without piracy incidents being reported. In addition to this 97 of kidnappings at sea occurred in 2020, making the region (stretching from Gabon to Liberia) a ‘Global Piracy Hotspot’.  The lack of resilience in the infrastructure of port security and a diminished ability to react to unexpected events like the spread of Covid-19 were identified by the UNODC as factors in this rise in piracy. The UNODC also explains this increase in attacks as being because of the freeze in activities on the docks due to quarantining, and a sharp decrease in incomes for already fragile shore populations devastated by extreme income inequality.

West Africa does not consist of nations drowning in rebel infested areas, and secessionist movements. Nor do they consist of failed states like Yemen or Somalia. Simultaneously, despite the absence of any Security Council action so far, unlike in the Gulf of Aden, in West Africa there is already an institutional infrastructure to combat piracy. The Economic Community for West African States (ECOWAS) has in its treaty of 1993 a maritime component intended to harmonize all maritime issues across the region; the Maritime Organization of West and Central Africa, established in the 1970s, holds member countries to a similar agreement. However, weak national navies, and an absolute lack of large fleets of international naval vessels patrolling the region only go to provide these militias and non-state actors safe haven to operate. The Gulf of Guinea does not harbour any potential reasons for an international intervention unlike in the Horn of Africa where the mandate of ‘Operation Ocean Shield’ was expanded to include the ‘Global War on Terror’ in light of the presence of terrorist organizations like Al-Shabaab and ISIS. Simultaneously, the oil rich nations of West Africa are not nearly as resourceful as the Middle-East, therefore, matters threatening supply chain logistics would only harm local exports, as any decrease in supply or increase in costs would cause Europe and China (where majority of exports are bound) to consider substituting imports from elsewhere. Hence the region in a way is ‘on its own’. The waters are strategic for Africa’s two largest oil rich nations (Nigeria and Angola), and consist of over a quarter of the continent’s maritime traffic, making it important to transport via the region without substantial threats. But with oil production volumes and pricacies increasing annually, this is improbable and only seems to get worse in the future.

Multiple steps need to be taken to enhance regional security. Firstly, an integration of West African intelligence community and defense forces to aid an absence of international cooperation while essentially utilizing relatively weak and unresourceful militaries is imperative to effectively monitor and surveil these unregulated waters. Secondly, states that face maritime and piracy challenges must look to develop strong legislation to prosecute criminals. Thirdly, joint training activities and military exercises are required to develop coercion leading to interoperability. Lastly, states shall work towards increasing defense budgets and procuring sophisticated weaponry while prioritizing it as a public policy issue. Clearly, both maritime security and governmental competence are hampered by capacity issues. Therefore, it is important for African states to work towards bridging the disjuncture between political will and readiness on one hand, and operational capability on the other.

Ojus Sharma

B.A Hons (Global Affairs) 2021

The political context of privity paradox: between consent and collateral casualties of modern democracy

“To be left alone is the most precious thing one can ask of the modern world.”

-Anthony Burges

Rapid digitalisation owing to technological advancements have made information readily available on the internet if one knows where and how to look. This makes it imperative to locate the right to privacy and the scope of data sharing, especially personal sensitive data. With digital economy overtaking, personal data has already become boundless. The increased digital activity assuredly involves some sort of data transaction leading to germination of entirely new market which profits from collection, organisation, processing and sale of personal sensitive information. Privacy has thus evolved as a basic human right recognised by international conventions as well as several nations, under doctrine of equity and right to democratic justice. The right to privacy provides individuals right over the control on collection, use and disclosure of personal information (defined differently as per jurisdictional laws). “Our own information is being weaponised against us with military efficiency. Every day, billions of dollars change hands and countless decisions are made on the basis of our likes and dislikes, our friends and families, our relationships and conversations, our wishes and fears, our hopes and dreams. These scraps of data, each one harmless enough on its own, are carefully assembled, synthesised, traded and sold” astutely encapsulated by Apple CEO, Tim Cook. There exist various techniques to cull out data from as simple as, a posted picture on social media. Techniques such as geocoding, clustering, geotagging etc. can be used to delve out information such as: camera used to click the picture, current location, service provider etc. Such data therefore shall be protected via stringent laws and cyber security provisions, from information tracking software such as Pegasus.

Indian laws on data protection

Indian laws have recognised Right to Privacy as an essential right to live a dignified life, therefore adding it under the ambit of Article 21 of Constitution of India as a fundamental right, courtesy Justice K.S. Puttuswamy  v. Union of India , (2017) 10 SCC 641. After years of conscious efforts via legislators and judiciary, the constitution yet fails to provide the Right to Privacy, an individual and well-defined space. India has a vast legal framework however lacks well established laws and agencies for data protection. Till recently, citizens were guarded by the IT Act, 2000 (amended in 2008). Several attempts were made to in the last decade to formulate well defined data protection laws which miserably failed due to lack of political will. In the meanwhile, data protection was being achieved under separate laws.

1. Section 43A and Section 72A, IT Act 2000 laid liability of the entities dealing with sensitive personal data in case of misappropriation for personal gains and/or disclosure without the consent of information owner (the person themselves).
2. Telegraph Act, 1885 and Telegraph Rules, 1951 provide provisions to regulate intersection of messages even via the state.
3. Information Technology (Reasonable Security Practices and Procedures and Sensitive Personal Data or Information) Rules (Privacy Rules), 2011 differentiated between personal and sensitive personal data, defining them under section 2(i) and section 3 respectively. These rules also ordain certain procedures to be followed by corporates collecting, processing and storing personal data.
4. Indian Ministry of Communications and Information issued a ‘Press Note’ Technology (Clarification on the Privacy Rules) in August 2011, restricting Indian outsourcing service providers/organisations, curbing collection or disclosure of personal or sensitive personal data within or outside India to prevent direct contact with information providers while providing their services.

Though the legislations seem sufficient, however due to the lack of execution, maintenance and awareness alongside, certain loopholes in the current framework put such sensitive data at risk of exposure. To cover the loopholes and strengthen data protection, Personal Data Protection Bill (PDPB), 2019 was processed, still pending for discussion in Lok Sabha. Despite careful consideration, yet the bill has several loopholes;

1. The inordinate amount of reliance on ‘consent’ to obtain personal sensitive data. It was observed in an American survey of 2018, that 74% of participants of a total of 543 preferred quick mode option to skip the policy section, and therefore 90% of the total preferred the quick join click wrap method more, as it helps to spring towards the main content without much ado.
2. Section 35 of the bill requires ‘any government agency’ to be exempted from the provision of the bill for any liabilities, processing or variety other grounds. This section is, however, inconsistent with the right to privacy under Article 21 and Puttaswamy case test established to keep governmental surveillance under check.
3. The bill proposes to formulate a complex data protection authority (DPAI). It has massive governmental interjection, capable enough to mold decisions, whilst owning great authority and autonomy in regulation and accepting further required amendments. For e.g., Section 86 of the bill exempts governmental directions to be publicly available in lieu of national interest.

The DPAI is dominated by governmental appointments and lack of independence owing to exemption of public sector bodies form the ambit of the bill, albeit restricting authority of data principles to make enforcement actions. The bill is also different in many ways from the Srikrishna Bill (the bill suggested by the committee formally constituted for concerned matter), especially concerning the scope of governmental surveillance. The bill nonetheless poses a good start as it institutionalises the concepts of consent, reasonable purpose and limits cross-border data flow.

China’s Laws on Data Protection

Being well versed with China’s sustained secrecy from the whole world, with filtered exchange of information in and out of China mainland, it is well known that citizens however do not enjoy the privilege of privacy. China took its first step towards personal data protection in 2014. The recently increased exchange rate of information between west and China anent rapid transformation of data privacy laws. It paved way for the 2018 law reforms, claimed by the drafter to be stricter than US, however not so much as EU laws. China evolved from the strict moral and behavioural social norms to nurture the notion of right to privacy, attributable to the revolutions of 19th century, emergence of urban life with individual rights. Nonetheless, China still follows the approach of ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’, derivative of consequences of cyber-sovereignty principle and the separation between privacy from private actors and privacy from the government, resembling the country’s socio-political context and geopolitical ambitions. Data protection laws were sustaining on other piecemeal laws, similar to Indian laws on the subject matter, however China recently, successfully passed new data privacy laws.

1. The PRC Civil Code, effective on January 1, 2021, reinforces the statutory right of privacy for individuals and establishes data protection principles.
2. Personal Information Protection Law of the People’s Republic of China (PIPL), passed on August 20, 2021 (effective Nov 1, 2021) (something India has not yet done) define and prevent personal and sensitive personal information.
3. Data Security Law (DSL) to be effective on 1st September 2021, strengthen overall online information protection against potential cybercrime.

PIPL is the country’s first law concerning the privacy of citizens before the nation. This law is applicable on corporations inside or entirely foreign based including functioning from foreign land, which collect, store, use, transmit, provide, or otherwise handle personal information belonging to natural persons within China’s borders. The ‘personal information handlers’ based outside mainland China are however required to have a representative or station an entity in China to comply with PIPL compliances. The definitions of personal information and sensitive personal information are rather more detailed and broader than the existing and proposed definitions in Indian laws. Alongside, DSL and PRC mandates storing a certain type of data on servers in China. The new DSL laws would prohibit export of data, without approval from Chinese authorities, to justice or law enforcement institutions of foreign states. digichina.stanford.edu/…/translation-personal-information-protection-law-peoples-republic-china-effective-nov-1-2021Article 6 of PIPL puts a ‘necessity test’ on export of personal information along consent from the individual and notice of purpose.

However, analysts believe that it would hardly interfere with country’s stringent surveillance (something similar to Indian proposed bill). Similar to Indian PDPB, PIPL relinquish autonomy to the Chinese government, for all transfer of information has to be sanctioned by government in one way or another.

Spyware and Data Privacy
Despite such exhaustive laws, under still face leak of data and fall prey to cybercrimes. It’s given that necessity is mother of creativity and thus with changing laws, the offenders come up with new tactics therefore it become fairly impossible to prepare 100% bullet proof laws. However, the offenders are not merely profiting corporate firms, governments (including our own) fall under the list of offenders. Customary established laws provide states with a right to spy. However, the autonomy levied in the hands of a group of people to decide the ‘legitimate aim’ for surveillance is more prone to de ́tournement de pouvoir (misuse of power). Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights further establishes that the interests of national security, public safety, the economic well-being of the country, the prevention of disorder or crime, the protection of public health or morals, and the protection of the rights and freedoms of others, can all be considered grounds for interferences with the right to privacy.

The recent revelation of Israeli NSO software, Pegasus being used by several governments for unnecessary surveillance has tainted the sanctity of espionage and right to spy. In Greek mythology, Pegasus was a winged divine horse carrying Zeus’s thunderbolt and helped accomplish many exploits. In today’s world, Pegasus project is termed as the ‘most sophisticated smartphone attack tool’, even targeting iOS. Allegedly Pegasus is a surveillance software, sold by the NSO Group to ‘vetted governments’ for ‘lawful interception’. This software functions on selling links via mobile or mails posing family member locations or such trusted disguised links. It was first detected in 2016 when human rights activist Ahmed Mansoor received a series of messages promising certain secrets about UAE Prison Torture. Post detection it was traced back to the IP address of NSO group. Pegasus now works on the ‘zero-link’ technology targeting ‘zero-day’ software vulnerabilities of which the developer is unaware yet, allowing easy access due to no updates or patches yet made. It then installs in the device to provide all type of required information including encrypted conversations. It can also turn your microphone or cameras on to know and listen to conversations.

The claimed healthy surveillance software recently hit headlines for leaked report, obtained by Paris-based journalism nonprofit Forbidden Stories and Amnesty International, of 50,000 phone numbers of human activists, vocal and liberal journalists, politicians and even prime ministers of some countries. It has also been proven in 2019, affirmed by Facebook that Pegasus is used to access messaging platforms such as WhatsApp of activists and journalists, right before the elections, which was informed to the government twice. The citizen lab report clarifies the question of the buyers of Pegasus as it is found with the governments of 45 countries, India being one of them, however China was not one of them. When asked from the Indian government about the allegation, in response the allegations were not denied, rather it revoked the section 69 of IT Act and section 5 of Telegraph Act which provides government right to surveillance for national security and public interest.

Alongside, Ministry of Home Affairs also granted surveillance rights to 10 agencies including Delhi Commissioner of Police, the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), and the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence, to pry on individual computers and their receipts and transmissions to “intercept, monitor and decrypt any “information generated, transmitted, received or stored in any computer resource”. While promoting Right to Privacy, providing access of personal sensitive data to bureaucrats is adversarial. India seems to be walking on the path of China with a slight difference of deceit. China does frequent but not constant surveillance with cameras perch on every street corner and bots monitor every corner of the internet. Chinese facial recognition systems instantly register concerned ethnicity and party membership. They even use their own social media and internet browsers to safe guard the regime. Such actions do not justify the newly formed Private Information Protection laws of both nations, as though the information is attempted to be safe from corporations and benefactors, however the Right to Privacy still remains breached. Moreover, trusting foreign surveillance software manufacturers, who make software for prioritisation cannot be trusted with such sensitive data. It is not secure to believe that the data secured by the government for its personal gain would not be sold to other buyers for their personal gains.

Conclusion

We are now being indoctrinated into thinking that when the spies connive the laws fall silent. It shan’t be the case as though espionage and surveillance is necessary for other rights like right to life and national security interests, there yet shall be proper process to be followed the targets to be bugged. Whilst constitution grants us right to life, it also grants us freedom of expression which is curbed via constant threat of surveillance. Due to security reasons it becomes fairly impossible to establish checks and balances thus a definite process shall be established. The process should entail thorough identification of possible threat, identifying the individual/group posing actual threat to national security (not merely anti-national thoughts and expression), trusted indigenous surveillance softwares and then execution of surveillance. This process if executed fairly can serve more beneficial for national security and do justice to the principles of right to spy and espionage.

ESHITA BOHRA

B.A. LL.B. Hons.(JGLS)

Our Founder: Dr. Shishir Upadhyaya

Research Assistant:
Name: Mohanasakthivel. J
Email: jmsakthivel@jgu.edu.in

List of Research Assistants

• Online guest lecture on “Harnessing and social media for corporate risk intelligence”

Dr. Shishir Upadhyaya, Associate Professor & Associate Dean
Director CIRA
Mobile: +91 9319224906
Email: supadhyaya@jgu.edu.in