{"id":14536,"date":"2024-04-17T17:38:34","date_gmt":"2024-04-17T17:38:34","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/jgu.edu.in\/mappingADR\/?p=14536"},"modified":"2024-04-17T17:38:34","modified_gmt":"2024-04-17T17:38:34","slug":"cox-and-kings-ltd-v-sap-india-pvt-limited-and-anr","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/jgu.edu.in\/mappingADR\/cox-and-kings-ltd-v-sap-india-pvt-limited-and-anr\/","title":{"rendered":"Cox and Kings Ltd. v. SAP India Pvt Limited and Anr"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<p id=\"foo\"><strong>Judgment Name: <\/strong><a href=\"https:\/\/main.sci.gov.in\/supremecourt\/2020\/21647\/21647_2020_1_1502_35704_Judgement_06-May-2022.pdf\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\" target=\"_blank\"><em>Cox and Kings Ltd. v SAP India Pvt Limited and Anr.<\/em><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p id=\"1eb52\"><strong>Citation:<\/strong> Arbitration Petition No. 38 of 2020<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p id=\"3tc50\"><strong>Court: <\/strong>Supreme Court of India<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p id=\"4nsrg\"><strong>Coram:<\/strong> N.V. Ramana; CJI, Surya Kant &amp; AS Bopanna, JJ.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p id=\"2v6hk\"><strong>Date:<\/strong> 6th June 2022<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p id=\"dbsmr\"><strong>Keywords:<\/strong> Group of Companies Doctrine, Section 11, Section 2(H), Section 8, Chloro Controls<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p id=\"524k5\"><strong>Facts<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p id=\"dg9mb\">On 14th December 2010, the Applicant and Respondent No. 1 entered into an SAP Software End User License Agreement and SAP Enterprise Support Schedule under which the Applicant was made a licensee of a certain software developed and owned by the Respondents. The agreement was divided into three separate transactions. First, the Software License and Support Agreement- Software Order Form 3 was signed between the Applicant and Respondent No. 1 for the purchase of the SAP Hybris Software License; Second, the Services General Terms and Conditions Agreement (\u201cGTC\u201d) containing the terms and conditions governing the implementation of the software was signed between the parties; Third, an agreement was entered into for the customization of the software.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p id=\"d05kl\">The GTC contained a dispute resolution clause under which, in the event of a conflict, the parties were obligated to settle their disputes amicably before referring it to a bench of three arbitrators.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p id=\"e30ub\">In 2016, a conflict arose, and the Applicant requested Respondent no. 2 (holding company of Respondent No. 1) to intervene. In response, Respondent No. 2 gave assurances to the Applicant. Subsequently, the contract could not be fulfilled despite the extended timelines and additional manpower, so it was rescinded on 15th November 2016, after which the Respondents withdrew their resources from the project. Pursuantly, the Applicant, demanded a refund of Rs. 45 crores.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p id=\"93cfd\">The conflict could not be settled amicably, and thereafter on 29th October 2017, Respondent No. 1 issued a notice invoking arbitration as per the GTC for the alleged wrongful termination of the contract and demanded payment of Rs. 17 crores. An Arbitral Tribunal was constituted, and Respondent No. 2 was not made a part of the proceedings. During the proceedings, the Applicant filed an application under Section 16 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (\u201cAct\u201d) before the Tribunal, contending that the four agreements entered between the parties are a part of a composite transaction and the same should be a part of a singular proceeding. Further, on 7th November 2019, the Applicant sent a notice invoking Arbitration arraying Respondent No. 2 in the Arbitration Proceedings. There was no response from the Respondent, after which the Applicant preferred an Application under Section 11 of the Act seeking appointment of the Arbitrator in an International Commercial Arbitration.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p id=\"3ip7b\"><strong>Issues<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p id=\"95ih5\">I. Whether the arbitration clause given under GTC can be invoked against Respondent 2, who is a non-signatory to the arbitration agreement?<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p id=\"b5clu\">II. Whether judicial precedents have adequately interpreted the Group of Companies Doctrine under Section 8 of the Act?<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p id=\"2m7in\"><strong>Decision<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p id=\"3mhos\">The Court iterated the ratio given under the <a href=\"https:\/\/www.trans-lex.org\/204131\/_\/icc-award-no-4131-yca-1984-at-131-et-seq-\/\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\" target=\"_blank\"><em>Dow Chemical Company v. Isover Saint Gobain<\/em><\/a> and noted that under Section 7, the consent of the parties is integral to arbitration, and the same ought to be expressed in a written form. The intention of the parties can be construed from written communication such as letters, telexes, telegrams, and even electronic messages. It examined the ambit of the \u201cGroup of Companies\u201d Doctrine <em>vis-\u00e0-vis <\/em><a href=\"https:\/\/main.sci.gov.in\/judgment\/judis\/39605.pdf\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\" target=\"_blank\"><em>Chloro Controls India Private Limited v. Severn Trent Water Purification Inc<\/em>.<\/a> The Court opined that the ratio in Chloro allowed joinders of non-signatories to the arbitration agreement and that such joinders found their genesis in the \u2018policy consideration of efficiency\u2019. It stated that without a legal basis, efficiency should not by itself be the sole ground to bind a party to the arbitration.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p id=\"7t2d0\">The Court laid out the Indian jurisprudential paradigm for the Group of Companies Doctrine starting with <a href=\"https:\/\/indiankanoon.org\/doc\/1591400\/\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\" target=\"_blank\"><em>Sukanya Holdings Pvt. Ltd. v. Jayesh H. Pandya<\/em><\/a>, wherein the Apex Court held that under Section 8 of the Act, causes of action could not be bifurcated in an arbitration, and non-\u00adparties to an arbitration agreement cannot be included in the same arbitration. Further, the Court distinguished between Section 45 and Section 8 of the Act as given in Chloro and iterated in the <em><\/em><a href=\"https:\/\/lawcommissionofindia.nic.in\/reports\/report246.pdf\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\" target=\"_blank\">246th Law Commission Report\u2019s<\/a> recommended amendment to Section 2(1)(h), which defines \u2018party\u2019, and Section 8 of the Act to modify the definition of \u2018party\u2019 to \u2018a party to an arbitration agreement or any person claiming or through or under such party\u2019 and the subsequent 2015 amendment to Section 8(1) of the Act to include \u2018any person claiming through or under him\u2019, The Court also looked at the cases of <a href=\"https:\/\/indiankanoon.org\/doc\/86950356\/\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\" target=\"_blank\"><em>Cheran Properties Ltd. v. Kasturi And Sons Ltd.<\/em><\/a>, wherein the Court interpreted Section 35 of the Act to enforce an award against a non-signatory, who had not participated in the proceedings.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p id=\"cbpn7\">Subsequently, it looked at <strong><em><\/em><\/strong><a href=\"https:\/\/indiankanoon.org\/doc\/6694102\/\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\" target=\"_blank\"><em>Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Ltd. v. Canara Bank<\/em><\/a><em>, <\/em>where it was observed that the Group of Companies Doctrine could be utilized to bind a third party to an arbitration if a tight corporate group structure constituting a single economic reality existed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p id=\"ct43e\">Thus, the Court challenged the correctness of the law laid down in <em>Chloro <\/em>and other subsequent cases, claiming that they have been decided without explaining the ambit of the phrase \u2018claiming through or under\u2019 as given under Section 8 of the Act. It observed that the doctrine engendered the joinder of non-signatories as \u201cparties in their own right\u201d instead of claiming through or under. Consequently, it held that the broad-based understanding of the doctrine in <em>Chloro <\/em>might be counterintuitive to the distinct legal identities of companies and party autonomy, highlighting the need to re-interpret the ingredients of the Group of Companies Doctrine.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p id=\"7lkb1\">Finally, it referred certain issues to a larger bench and deferred its judgment for the current factual matrix. The referred issues were:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ol class=\"wp-block-list\" id=\"0rru1gxxwvww6g14460\">\n<li>Whether phrase \u2018claiming through or under\u2019 in Sections 8 and 11 could be interpreted to include the \u2018Group of Companies\u2019 Doctrine?<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Whether the \u2018Group of Companies\u2019 Doctrine as expounded by <em>Chloro<\/em> and subsequent judgments are valid in law?<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n<p id=\"1pklh\"><strong>Conclusion<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p id=\"9gm88\">By referring the decision to a larger bench, the Court has invited scrutiny on the Group of Companies Doctrine through the lens of company law principles such as <em>alter ego<\/em> and piercing the corporate veil. It paves the way for courts to decide the ambit of implied consent of non-signatory parties and the threshold of such consent for them to be bound to the arbitration agreement. Further, it threatens to upend the Indian jurisprudence on the Group of Companies Doctrine and gives the courts the freedom to determine the threshold of implied consent that can qualify a non-signatory party as one bound by the arbitration agreement.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Judgment Name: Cox and Kings Ltd. v SAP India Pvt Limited and Anr. Citation: Arbitration Petition No. 38 of 2020 Court: Supreme Court of India Coram: N.V. Ramana; CJI, Surya Kant &amp; AS Bopanna, JJ. Date: 6th June 2022 Keywords: Group of Companies Doctrine, Section 11, Section 2(H), Section 8, Chloro Controls Facts On 14th December 2010, the Applicant and Respondent No. 1 entered into an SAP Software End User License Agreement and SAP Enterprise Support Schedule under which the Applicant was made a licensee of a certain software developed and owned by the Respondents. The agreement was divided into three separate transactions. First, the Software License and Support Agreement- Software Order Form 3 was signed between the Applicant and Respondent No. 1 for the purchase of the SAP Hybris Software License; Second, the Services General Terms and Conditions Agreement (\u201cGTC\u201d) containing the terms and conditions governing the implementation of the software was signed between the parties; Third, an agreement was entered into for the customization of the software. The GTC contained a dispute resolution clause under which, in the event of a conflict, the parties were obligated to settle their disputes amicably before referring it to a bench of three arbitrators. In 2016, a conflict arose, and the Applicant requested Respondent no. 2 (holding company of Respondent No. 1) to intervene. In response, Respondent No. 2 gave assurances to the Applicant. Subsequently, the contract could not be fulfilled despite the extended timelines and additional manpower, so it was rescinded on 15th November 2016, after which the Respondents withdrew their resources from the project. Pursuantly, the Applicant, demanded a refund of Rs. 45 crores. The conflict could not be settled amicably, and thereafter on 29th October 2017, Respondent No. 1 issued a notice invoking arbitration as per the GTC for the alleged wrongful termination of the contract and demanded payment of Rs. 17 crores. An Arbitral Tribunal was constituted, and Respondent No. 2 was not made a part of the proceedings. During the proceedings, the Applicant filed an application under Section 16 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (\u201cAct\u201d) before the Tribunal, contending that the four agreements entered between the parties are a part of a composite transaction and the same should be a part of a singular proceeding. Further, on 7th November 2019, the Applicant sent a notice invoking Arbitration arraying Respondent No. 2 in the Arbitration Proceedings. There was no response from the Respondent, after which the Applicant preferred an Application under Section 11 of the Act seeking appointment of the Arbitrator in an International Commercial Arbitration. Issues I. Whether the arbitration clause given under GTC can be invoked against Respondent 2, who is a non-signatory to the arbitration agreement? II. Whether judicial precedents have adequately interpreted the Group of Companies Doctrine under Section 8 of the Act? Decision The Court iterated the ratio given under the Dow Chemical Company v. Isover Saint Gobain and noted that under Section 7, the consent of the parties is integral to arbitration, and the same ought to be expressed in a written form. The intention of the parties can be construed from written communication such as letters, telexes, telegrams, and even electronic messages. It examined the ambit of the \u201cGroup of Companies\u201d Doctrine vis-\u00e0-vis Chloro Controls India Private Limited v. Severn Trent Water Purification Inc. The Court opined that the ratio in Chloro allowed joinders of non-signatories to the arbitration agreement and that such joinders found their genesis in the \u2018policy consideration of efficiency\u2019. It stated that without a legal basis, efficiency should not by itself be the sole ground to bind a party to the arbitration. The Court laid out the Indian jurisprudential paradigm for the Group of Companies Doctrine starting with Sukanya Holdings Pvt. Ltd. v. Jayesh H. Pandya, wherein the Apex Court held that under Section 8 of the Act, causes of action could not be bifurcated in an arbitration, and non-\u00adparties to an arbitration agreement cannot be included in the same arbitration. Further, the Court distinguished between Section 45 and Section 8 of the Act as given in Chloro and iterated in the 246th Law Commission Report\u2019s recommended amendment to Section 2(1)(h), which defines \u2018party\u2019, and Section 8 of the Act to modify the definition of \u2018party\u2019 to \u2018a party to an arbitration agreement or any person claiming or through or under such party\u2019 and the subsequent 2015 amendment to Section 8(1) of the Act to include \u2018any person claiming through or under him\u2019, The Court also looked at the cases of Cheran Properties Ltd. v. Kasturi And Sons Ltd., wherein the Court interpreted Section 35 of the Act to enforce an award against a non-signatory, who had not participated in the proceedings. Subsequently, it looked at Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Ltd. v. Canara Bank, where it was observed that the Group of Companies Doctrine could be utilized to bind a third party to an arbitration if a tight corporate group structure constituting a single economic reality existed. Thus, the Court challenged the correctness of the law laid down in Chloro and other subsequent cases, claiming that they have been decided without explaining the ambit of the phrase \u2018claiming through or under\u2019 as given under Section 8 of the Act. It observed that the doctrine engendered the joinder of non-signatories as \u201cparties in their own right\u201d instead of claiming through or under. Consequently, it held that the broad-based understanding of the doctrine in Chloro might be counterintuitive to the distinct legal identities of companies and party autonomy, highlighting the need to re-interpret the ingredients of the Group of Companies Doctrine. Finally, it referred certain issues to a larger bench and deferred its judgment for the current factual matrix. The referred issues were: Conclusion By referring the decision to a larger bench, the Court has invited scrutiny on the Group of Companies Doctrine through the lens of company law principles such as alter ego and piercing the corporate veil. It paves the way for courts to decide [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":14,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1,138],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-14536","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-all","category-case-updates","post-no-thumbnail"],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO plugin v23.6 - https:\/\/yoast.com\/wordpress\/plugins\/seo\/ -->\n<title>Cox and Kings Ltd. v. SAP India Pvt Limited and Anr | Mapping ADR<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/jgu.edu.in\/mappingADR\/cox-and-kings-ltd-v-sap-india-pvt-limited-and-anr\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Cox and Kings Ltd. v. SAP India Pvt Limited and Anr | Mapping ADR\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"Judgment Name: Cox and Kings Ltd. v SAP India Pvt Limited and Anr. Citation: Arbitration Petition No. 38 of 2020 Court: Supreme Court of India Coram: N.V. Ramana; CJI, Surya Kant &amp; AS Bopanna, JJ. Date: 6th June 2022 Keywords: Group of Companies Doctrine, Section 11, Section 2(H), Section 8, Chloro Controls Facts On 14th December 2010, the Applicant and Respondent No. 1 entered into an SAP Software End User License Agreement and SAP Enterprise Support Schedule under which the Applicant was made a licensee of a certain software developed and owned by the Respondents. The agreement was divided into three separate transactions. First, the Software License and Support Agreement- Software Order Form 3 was signed between the Applicant and Respondent No. 1 for the purchase of the SAP Hybris Software License; Second, the Services General Terms and Conditions Agreement (\u201cGTC\u201d) containing the terms and conditions governing the implementation of the software was signed between the parties; Third, an agreement was entered into for the customization of the software. The GTC contained a dispute resolution clause under which, in the event of a conflict, the parties were obligated to settle their disputes amicably before referring it to a bench of three arbitrators. In 2016, a conflict arose, and the Applicant requested Respondent no. 2 (holding company of Respondent No. 1) to intervene. In response, Respondent No. 2 gave assurances to the Applicant. Subsequently, the contract could not be fulfilled despite the extended timelines and additional manpower, so it was rescinded on 15th November 2016, after which the Respondents withdrew their resources from the project. Pursuantly, the Applicant, demanded a refund of Rs. 45 crores. The conflict could not be settled amicably, and thereafter on 29th October 2017, Respondent No. 1 issued a notice invoking arbitration as per the GTC for the alleged wrongful termination of the contract and demanded payment of Rs. 17 crores. An Arbitral Tribunal was constituted, and Respondent No. 2 was not made a part of the proceedings. During the proceedings, the Applicant filed an application under Section 16 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (\u201cAct\u201d) before the Tribunal, contending that the four agreements entered between the parties are a part of a composite transaction and the same should be a part of a singular proceeding. Further, on 7th November 2019, the Applicant sent a notice invoking Arbitration arraying Respondent No. 2 in the Arbitration Proceedings. There was no response from the Respondent, after which the Applicant preferred an Application under Section 11 of the Act seeking appointment of the Arbitrator in an International Commercial Arbitration. Issues I. Whether the arbitration clause given under GTC can be invoked against Respondent 2, who is a non-signatory to the arbitration agreement? II. Whether judicial precedents have adequately interpreted the Group of Companies Doctrine under Section 8 of the Act? Decision The Court iterated the ratio given under the Dow Chemical Company v. Isover Saint Gobain and noted that under Section 7, the consent of the parties is integral to arbitration, and the same ought to be expressed in a written form. The intention of the parties can be construed from written communication such as letters, telexes, telegrams, and even electronic messages. It examined the ambit of the \u201cGroup of Companies\u201d Doctrine vis-\u00e0-vis Chloro Controls India Private Limited v. Severn Trent Water Purification Inc. The Court opined that the ratio in Chloro allowed joinders of non-signatories to the arbitration agreement and that such joinders found their genesis in the \u2018policy consideration of efficiency\u2019. It stated that without a legal basis, efficiency should not by itself be the sole ground to bind a party to the arbitration. The Court laid out the Indian jurisprudential paradigm for the Group of Companies Doctrine starting with Sukanya Holdings Pvt. Ltd. v. Jayesh H. Pandya, wherein the Apex Court held that under Section 8 of the Act, causes of action could not be bifurcated in an arbitration, and non-\u00adparties to an arbitration agreement cannot be included in the same arbitration. Further, the Court distinguished between Section 45 and Section 8 of the Act as given in Chloro and iterated in the 246th Law Commission Report\u2019s recommended amendment to Section 2(1)(h), which defines \u2018party\u2019, and Section 8 of the Act to modify the definition of \u2018party\u2019 to \u2018a party to an arbitration agreement or any person claiming or through or under such party\u2019 and the subsequent 2015 amendment to Section 8(1) of the Act to include \u2018any person claiming through or under him\u2019, The Court also looked at the cases of Cheran Properties Ltd. v. Kasturi And Sons Ltd., wherein the Court interpreted Section 35 of the Act to enforce an award against a non-signatory, who had not participated in the proceedings. Subsequently, it looked at Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Ltd. v. Canara Bank, where it was observed that the Group of Companies Doctrine could be utilized to bind a third party to an arbitration if a tight corporate group structure constituting a single economic reality existed. Thus, the Court challenged the correctness of the law laid down in Chloro and other subsequent cases, claiming that they have been decided without explaining the ambit of the phrase \u2018claiming through or under\u2019 as given under Section 8 of the Act. It observed that the doctrine engendered the joinder of non-signatories as \u201cparties in their own right\u201d instead of claiming through or under. Consequently, it held that the broad-based understanding of the doctrine in Chloro might be counterintuitive to the distinct legal identities of companies and party autonomy, highlighting the need to re-interpret the ingredients of the Group of Companies Doctrine. Finally, it referred certain issues to a larger bench and deferred its judgment for the current factual matrix. The referred issues were: Conclusion By referring the decision to a larger bench, the Court has invited scrutiny on the Group of Companies Doctrine through the lens of company law principles such as alter ego and piercing the corporate veil. It paves the way for courts to decide [&hellip;]\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/jgu.edu.in\/mappingADR\/cox-and-kings-ltd-v-sap-india-pvt-limited-and-anr\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"Mapping ADR\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:published_time\" content=\"2024-04-17T17:38:34+00:00\" \/>\n<meta name=\"author\" content=\"vrpeesari\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Written by\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"vrpeesari\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:label2\" content=\"Est. reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data2\" content=\"5 minutes\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\/\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/jgu.edu.in\/mappingADR\/cox-and-kings-ltd-v-sap-india-pvt-limited-and-anr\/\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/jgu.edu.in\/mappingADR\/cox-and-kings-ltd-v-sap-india-pvt-limited-and-anr\/\",\"name\":\"Cox and Kings Ltd. v. 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SAP India Pvt Limited and Anr | Mapping ADR","robots":{"index":"index","follow":"follow","max-snippet":"max-snippet:-1","max-image-preview":"max-image-preview:large","max-video-preview":"max-video-preview:-1"},"canonical":"https:\/\/jgu.edu.in\/mappingADR\/cox-and-kings-ltd-v-sap-india-pvt-limited-and-anr\/","og_locale":"en_US","og_type":"article","og_title":"Cox and Kings Ltd. v. SAP India Pvt Limited and Anr | Mapping ADR","og_description":"Judgment Name: Cox and Kings Ltd. v SAP India Pvt Limited and Anr. Citation: Arbitration Petition No. 38 of 2020 Court: Supreme Court of India Coram: N.V. Ramana; CJI, Surya Kant &amp; AS Bopanna, JJ. Date: 6th June 2022 Keywords: Group of Companies Doctrine, Section 11, Section 2(H), Section 8, Chloro Controls Facts On 14th December 2010, the Applicant and Respondent No. 1 entered into an SAP Software End User License Agreement and SAP Enterprise Support Schedule under which the Applicant was made a licensee of a certain software developed and owned by the Respondents. The agreement was divided into three separate transactions. First, the Software License and Support Agreement- Software Order Form 3 was signed between the Applicant and Respondent No. 1 for the purchase of the SAP Hybris Software License; Second, the Services General Terms and Conditions Agreement (\u201cGTC\u201d) containing the terms and conditions governing the implementation of the software was signed between the parties; Third, an agreement was entered into for the customization of the software. The GTC contained a dispute resolution clause under which, in the event of a conflict, the parties were obligated to settle their disputes amicably before referring it to a bench of three arbitrators. In 2016, a conflict arose, and the Applicant requested Respondent no. 2 (holding company of Respondent No. 1) to intervene. In response, Respondent No. 2 gave assurances to the Applicant. Subsequently, the contract could not be fulfilled despite the extended timelines and additional manpower, so it was rescinded on 15th November 2016, after which the Respondents withdrew their resources from the project. Pursuantly, the Applicant, demanded a refund of Rs. 45 crores. The conflict could not be settled amicably, and thereafter on 29th October 2017, Respondent No. 1 issued a notice invoking arbitration as per the GTC for the alleged wrongful termination of the contract and demanded payment of Rs. 17 crores. An Arbitral Tribunal was constituted, and Respondent No. 2 was not made a part of the proceedings. During the proceedings, the Applicant filed an application under Section 16 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (\u201cAct\u201d) before the Tribunal, contending that the four agreements entered between the parties are a part of a composite transaction and the same should be a part of a singular proceeding. Further, on 7th November 2019, the Applicant sent a notice invoking Arbitration arraying Respondent No. 2 in the Arbitration Proceedings. There was no response from the Respondent, after which the Applicant preferred an Application under Section 11 of the Act seeking appointment of the Arbitrator in an International Commercial Arbitration. Issues I. Whether the arbitration clause given under GTC can be invoked against Respondent 2, who is a non-signatory to the arbitration agreement? II. Whether judicial precedents have adequately interpreted the Group of Companies Doctrine under Section 8 of the Act? Decision The Court iterated the ratio given under the Dow Chemical Company v. Isover Saint Gobain and noted that under Section 7, the consent of the parties is integral to arbitration, and the same ought to be expressed in a written form. The intention of the parties can be construed from written communication such as letters, telexes, telegrams, and even electronic messages. It examined the ambit of the \u201cGroup of Companies\u201d Doctrine vis-\u00e0-vis Chloro Controls India Private Limited v. Severn Trent Water Purification Inc. The Court opined that the ratio in Chloro allowed joinders of non-signatories to the arbitration agreement and that such joinders found their genesis in the \u2018policy consideration of efficiency\u2019. It stated that without a legal basis, efficiency should not by itself be the sole ground to bind a party to the arbitration. The Court laid out the Indian jurisprudential paradigm for the Group of Companies Doctrine starting with Sukanya Holdings Pvt. Ltd. v. Jayesh H. Pandya, wherein the Apex Court held that under Section 8 of the Act, causes of action could not be bifurcated in an arbitration, and non-\u00adparties to an arbitration agreement cannot be included in the same arbitration. Further, the Court distinguished between Section 45 and Section 8 of the Act as given in Chloro and iterated in the 246th Law Commission Report\u2019s recommended amendment to Section 2(1)(h), which defines \u2018party\u2019, and Section 8 of the Act to modify the definition of \u2018party\u2019 to \u2018a party to an arbitration agreement or any person claiming or through or under such party\u2019 and the subsequent 2015 amendment to Section 8(1) of the Act to include \u2018any person claiming through or under him\u2019, The Court also looked at the cases of Cheran Properties Ltd. v. Kasturi And Sons Ltd., wherein the Court interpreted Section 35 of the Act to enforce an award against a non-signatory, who had not participated in the proceedings. Subsequently, it looked at Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Ltd. v. Canara Bank, where it was observed that the Group of Companies Doctrine could be utilized to bind a third party to an arbitration if a tight corporate group structure constituting a single economic reality existed. Thus, the Court challenged the correctness of the law laid down in Chloro and other subsequent cases, claiming that they have been decided without explaining the ambit of the phrase \u2018claiming through or under\u2019 as given under Section 8 of the Act. It observed that the doctrine engendered the joinder of non-signatories as \u201cparties in their own right\u201d instead of claiming through or under. Consequently, it held that the broad-based understanding of the doctrine in Chloro might be counterintuitive to the distinct legal identities of companies and party autonomy, highlighting the need to re-interpret the ingredients of the Group of Companies Doctrine. Finally, it referred certain issues to a larger bench and deferred its judgment for the current factual matrix. The referred issues were: Conclusion By referring the decision to a larger bench, the Court has invited scrutiny on the Group of Companies Doctrine through the lens of company law principles such as alter ego and piercing the corporate veil. 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